Thai-Style “Democracy,” 1958-2010
Last month I had the honor of being invited by the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand to participate in a panel discussion with former cabinet minister Suranand Vejjajiva and acting government spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn. The subject was “Tanks, Thaksin and $2 Billion.” On the day of the event, I was informed by the organizers that Dr. Panitan had requested (and had, of course, obtained) to appear solo for the first 45 minutes, at the end of which he would leave and allow the event to continue in his absence. It has been reported already that Panitan spent much of his time insisting on the themes of “democracy” and “the rule of law” — the irony of which I subsequently had the opportunity to point out. In retrospect, however, a more dramatic and revealing moment came when Panitan allowed flashes of sincerity to percolate through an otherwise largely dissembling presentation on Thailand’s ongoing political crisis.
“What happened to us?” — he wondered aloud, an expression of stunned disbelief on his face — “what happened to our patience, to our tolerance, to mai bpen rai?”
Of course, anyone with a cursory knowledge of the country’s history already knows that Thailand’s ruling class has never been famous for taking anything like a “mai bpen rai” approach in dealing with challenges to its authority. So it was hard to escape the conclusion that Panitan could not have been lamenting the change he observed in the posture of generals, noblemen, privy councillors, politicians, and crony capitalists of all colors and stripes. His dismay could only have been directed at the vast majority of the Thai public, at those who have long been expected to turn the other cheek to violence, injustice, and exploitation. It is only their refusal to accept the latest usurpation of their power, their failure to take it lying down, that could now lead the noted sakdina intellectual to profess his bewilderment. Certainly, Panitan’s astonishment and anguish are shared rather broadly these days within Thailand’s increasingly besieged political establishment.
Not five decades ago, political scientist David Wilson described Thai society in terms that might perhaps provide a window into the source of Panitan’s bemusement. Wilson observed “a clear distinction between those who are involved in politics and those who are not” and noted, ever matter-of-factly, that “the overwhelming majority of the adult population is not.” He went on to say:
The peasantry as the basic productive force constitutes more than 80 percent of the population and is the foundation of the social structure. But its inarticulate acquiescence to the central government and indifference to national politics are fundamental to the political system. A tolerable economic situation which provides a stable subsistence without encouraging any great hope for quick improvement is no doubt the background of this political inaction.
As it turns out, David Wilson was correct to identify in the “acquiescence” and “indifference” of the vast majority of the public the fundamental basis of “Thai-Style Democracy” — a system of government that, notwithstanding the shallow deference paid to some of the most meaningless trappings of democracy, largely preserved the right of men of high birth, status, and wealth to run the country. Indeed, it was in the interest of building this system of government that Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat insisted that peasants continue to live off the land. It was in the interest of preserving this system of government that the Thai people have more recently been urged to walk “backwards into a klong” and renounce progress in favor of a simpler existence. And it was in the interest of reiterating what this system of government once expected of them that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva recently promised that everything will be fine, so long as the Thai people accept their station in life and, as he put it, continue to ”do their jobs lawfully.”
“Thai-style democracy” was not destroyed in one day. Despite increasingly desperate pleas to be content with what they have, over time the people of Thailand have had enough of “stable subsistence” and have flocked to Bangkok to fulfill dreams their leaders said they should not dare harbor. Economic growth and modernization gave rise to hopes that a “quick” and decisive “improvement” in their material condition was now within their grasp. Confronted with the refusal by the country’s ruling class to grant them a fair share of the country’s newfound prosperity — reliably built on the backs of the people — they shed their “indifference” and began to vote, en masse, for those who at least bothered to pay some lip service to their empowerment. And when their will was overturned, not once but three times over the last four years, for many among them “acquiescence” was quite simply no longer an option. “Mai bpen rai” has turned into “mai yorm rap.”
For a variety of reasons — not the least of which is the cretinous arrogance of its guardians — “Thai-style democracy” has been in failing health for almost two decades. It finally died last week, overpowered by the tens of thousands of people who marched on Bangkok to demand equality, justice, and “real” democracy. Last Saturday, its corpse was paraded through the city in a festive, 50-kilometer-long procession — an unmistakably Thai rendition of a New Orleans jazz funeral.
The red shirts could never hope to bring a million people to Bangkok, given the monumental logistical challenges that would have presented under the best of circumstances. At the end of the day, their numbers were depressed further by the fact that these were not the best of circumstances. Thanks, in part, to the complicity of their own, most dimwitted leaders, in advance of the march the reds were successfully portrayed as barbarian, “rural hordes” — most of them paid, some of them brainwashed, many among them not really Thai — determined to lay waste to the capital city in a last-ditch effort to rescue the dwindling fortunes of one man. Just in case the widely anticipated prospects of violence and chaos (periodically revitalized by staged police raids and mysterious bomb attacks) had failed to scare enough people into staying home, hundreds of tripwires were laid down in the form of checkpoints extending deep into the Isan countryside. Then, just at the opportune time, the government pressed the panic button when it imposed the Internal Security Act and began speaking openly about the possibility of an emergency decree — what would amount, in practice, to an autogolpe.
And yet they came — not in large enough numbers to inaugurate a new system of government, to be sure, but in numbers certainly large enough to trample the old one to death. Some have argued, with merit, that their goals remain unclear, their motives diverse, their demands inarticulate, their strategy underdeveloped, and their leadership coarse, homophobic, and hopelessly divided against itself. Still, the death of the old system requires no clear vision, no unanimity of motive, no strategic acumen, and no enlightened leader; indeed, it does not even require the physical removal of the current puppet regime. What definitively snuffed the life out of “Thai-style democracy” is that its foundation of indifference and sheepish acquiescence has been thoroughly dismantled.
The red shirts may well be confused about what they want to build, but they now have a good idea of what they are against. Perhaps the most revealing development in this regard is the resurrection and endless repetition of the word “phrai,” a word that strips its complement — “amartaya” — of all its remaining ambiguity. Phrai does not mean “slave,” “proletarian,” or “pauper.” It means commoner. And though attempts to spin and muddle the meaning of this phrasing are legion, everyone knows what a “commoner” is not.
Whatever the Prime Minister might say, this is not a “class war” in the sense that it pits poor against rich. This fight is about restoring the aristocracy to the ceremonial role it formally accepted, at the barrel of a gun, on June 24, 1932. Most importantly, this fight is about subjecting the amartaya — the mandarins and praetorian guards, most themselves phrai by birth, who have long exploited the pretense of defending the monarchy to hoard power and riches for themselves — to the will of the people. And while the reds have yet to achieve either of those goals, “Thai-style democracy” could no longer endure once its founding ideology was exposed as an especially ignoble adaptation of Plato’s “Noble Lie.” It is merely by standing up to say “enough” that hundreds of thousands of people, many belonging to social classes whose right to participate in the country’s governance has never before been acknowledged, accomplished what previous democratic movements could not — put the old system to death. While no one knows exactly what kind of new social contract will take shape in the years to come, the only chance of stability is offered by one that recognizes the people’s right to govern their own country. A “real” democracy, if you will.
“Thai-style democracy,” the spawn of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, is survived by its adoptive father and its loving caretaker of three decades. There can be little doubt that the latter, now aged 89, will spend the rest of his days clinging to the vestiges of the old system like a grief-stricken gorilla sometimes spends weeks carrying around the carcass of her dead pup. One can only hope that those around him will have the presence of mind not to embark on a collective suicide mission, throwing themselves in the path of a stampede in the deluded hope that they might somehow bring back to life what has now been definitively consigned to the history books. With some notable exceptions, it seems, the people of Thailand are no longer willing to prostrate themselves to the level of dogs.
(26 votes, average: 4.65 out of 5)
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very good perspective… thank you, may the article be read by many!
I think the redshirts and their leaders are a but more aware and directed than you suggest…
they do want democracy, I think they understand about free and fair elections under a fair constitution, they also know that the military, active and retired, privy councilors, etc, need to be brought under control of their government and the judiciary needs to be cleaned
also I think they know they need a strong leader that they can trust to push through all these difficult tasks, and not let the country collapse financially in the effort
and that is why they support Thaksin to be their leader… if Thaksin is not available for some reason they will search for another strong and motivated person…
I also think that the redshirt leaders have given the government rope to display its own panic and lack of principles while maintaining their own peaceful pressure
I think many Thais, including the Amart recognise what has happened and as you say it is apparent that they recognise their world has changed
its just a question of how painful the reshaping process becomes and, as in many of todays democracues how disappointing the end result will be for the ordinary people
most western democracies have invented their own way of continuing to elect and empowering a capitalist amart while the ordinary people believe they are free but in reality live under the their rule
see for a grotesque western democratic example:
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/mar2010/pete-m23.shtml
Federico, how about this version of events?
“Thai style democracy” died in 1992 when Bangkok middle class took to the streets to rout out Suchinda. Unlike previous mass protests this one led to a widely revered 1997 “people” constitution that made the rulers responsible not only during “Thai style” elections but they demanded transparency, accountability, and public participation at all levels of decision making, and they laid out plain, clear, and non-negotiable rules on conflict of interest and abuse of power.
Chavalit, Snoh, Sanan, Chalerm, Newin, Banharn and numerous others were openly and publicly called dinosaurs that have no place in a new Thai politics.
Thaksin’s rule, however, turned into a resurrection of that old “Thai style democracy” with population being brainwashed into absolute trust in their Dear Leader and expected to be compliant and eternally thankful. The dead dinosaurs were brought back and re-instated with all pomp and glory. Pesky middle classes and their intellectual backers were ostracized by the Dear Leader himself and were often called “unThai” for stirring up the trouble and spoiling the nation’s harmonious existence.
Eventually they took to the streets again and told Thaksin in no uncertain terms that his version of “Thai style democracy” will not be tolerated. The generals, who bought into 1997 liberal agenda, backed them up, and Thaskin was removed via a coup, when everything else failed.
Then Thaksin brought his rural congregation to the streets to prove that his flock has got democratic aspirations, too, and so needs to be listened, but, so far, they are viewed as clueless latecomers marching to one man’s tune.
The middle classes figured out what they want and how it should be done some fifteen years ago, and they actually made it happen. Reds’ vision for the country, by contrast, is non-existent, their goals unclear, motives diverse, leaders divided and so on.
1997 ideals that the middle classes aspire to have not even been shaken, let alone dead.
The “ammart”, Thaksin’s hi-so enemies, are irrelevant to day-to-day running the country and “double standards” or “phrai” cries are highly hypocritical when they come from Thaksin’s mouth.
You can declare your version of “Thai style democracy” dead when these ideas start making sense to the non-red population and they decide to do something about it. That hasn’t happened so far, at most they might ask for PAD prosecution for airport blockade, and the rest of the system is fine as it is and actually needs protection from being destroyed by red “troglodytes”.
Hi StanG, though I disagree with parts of what you wrote, I think you have raised a number of valid points. So thank you for taking the time to contribute your thoughts. Let me offer a few observations on some of the issues you brought up.
First, my interpretation of the events of 1992 is not entirely different from yours; indeed, that’s what I had in mind when I wrote that TSD “has been in failing health for almost two decades.” I guess we differ on this point. To the extent that TSD means, in essence, that there are vast reserve domains for different kinds of “unelected institutions” — and the exercise of those reserve domains is broadly accepted as legitimate — the 1992 uprising could certainly be seen as the beginning of the end. The fact, however, that the 2006 coup went off without a hitch is, I think, pretty good indication that these unelected institutions could still replace the people’s choices with their own (whatever the merits of doing so) and encounter minimal/no open resistance as of three or four years ago. What happened after the 2006 coup seems to have changed all that.
Second, I more or less share your antipathy for Thaksin. Indeed, if I were Thai I probably would not have voted for him in 2001, 2005, and 2006 and would have in all likelihood participated in the demonstrations against him in 2006. At the same time, however, I can see why so many people (including some I know quite well) like him; to put it rather crudely, he is the first national leader who made them feel like they mattered. As for his cult of personality, I must confess that when I think of the idea of a “Dear Leader” in relation to Thailand, Thaksin isn’t the first person who comes to mind…
Third, I somewhat disagree with your assessment that “Chavalit, Snoh, Sanan, Chalerm, Newin, Banharn,” and the rest of were “brought back and re-instated with all pomp and glory” by Thaksin. Thaksin used them for his own purposes but then sought to crush their power, no doubt in an attempt to concentrate power in his own hands. Ironically, the power of people like Newin and Banharn is now arguably greater than it was during Thaksin’s administration. The fact is that the “unelected institutions” that have staged the coup have never really had much of a problem with characters like Newin and Banharn, so long as they didn’t act outside certain confines. Take Banharn, for example. Banharn’s “corruption” wasn’t a problem when he was part of Prem’s government in the 1980s; it became an issue only when Chatichai was in power. I don’t see any evidence that Banharn’s behavior was any different in 1987 than it was in 1991 — or that his behavior is any different now than it was in 2005.
Finally, I don’t think we can say that the “amartaya” are “irrelevant to day-to-day running the country.” The way I see it, the military especially seems to be very much in charge. Absent that, it’s hard to see how Abhisit would have ever become PM or remained in that position as long as he has.
Just to clarify one point. When I say that TSD is “dead” I don’t mean to say that some of the people/institutions I mentioned (and some I didn’t mention directly) no longer have any power. Far from it. What I mean to say is that, given that for one reason or the other TSD has lost the foundation of “indifference” and “acquiescence” it was once based on, it is no longer a viable system of government. In other words, there can no longer be any hope of peace/stability in Thailand until these (still admittedly powerful) “unelected institutions” give up their extra-constitutional role.
By “pomp and glory” I mostly meant Chavalit with his endless re-entries into politics after 1997 fiasco. At one point he even became an acting PM, when Thaksin was out of the country (from memory).
Banharn and Newin nowadays have more leverage, not more weight or credibility, or trust.
I realized now why you would not immediately think of Thaksin as a Dear Leader, but you probably didn’t see his face and voice occupying every possible media channel 24/7, solving every possible problem and promising to solve even more.
He was never in the competition with the monarchy, however, they belonged to different worlds that never crossed.
2006 coup went without a hitch because coup makers were seen as upholding ideals of 1997 constitution, not vestiges of some old, dying, right wing power.
After bangling up post coup governance I don’t see how they can meddle with Abhisit’s cabinet. You make it sound like the ministers receive their daily to-do lists from assigned “ammart” handlers.
If, however, you can clarify how exactly ammarts exercise their powers and how they should be curbed, please kindly pass it on to the red leaders, too. They deserve to know.
“it seems, the people of Thailand are no longer willing to prostrate themselves to the level of dogs.”
nor troglogytes Stan
nor buffaloes
nor mongrels
and a whole list of other derogatory terms. People have taken offence.
Welcome back to the blogosphere Khi Kwai, your invaluable contributions have been sorely missed.
Frederico, I translated and posted your article in German. I hope you do not mind … (http://www.schoenes-thailand.de/news/politik/thai-stil-demokratie-1958-2010.html) I cut out only very little to fit it into the framework and mentioned the original source.
“If, however, you can clarify how exactly ammarts exercise their powers and how they should be curbed, please kindly pass it on to the red leaders, too. They deserve to know.”
Stan: I am afraid that the “how they can be curbed” part is way above my pay grade. As for “how exactly ammarts exercise their powers,” I don’t think that the red shirts need any lessons from me given that many of their leaders were either once part of that system or were part of governments that bumped against the power of the amartaya at one time or another.
In the interest of clarity, however, these are just some of the tools the amartaya have at their disposal to influence or compel a civilian government:
1. Cajoling and soft pressure by people of status and barami, who can intervene through public statements and symbolic gestures designed to alternatively strengthen or discredit an elected government;
2. Influence on the courts. Recall that the Democrats still have a dissolution case pending…
3. Influence over the coverage of media outlets owned by the military and by the associates of some prominent amartaya. The media coverage can be employed to extol the government’s virtues, or alternatively to portray it as weak, incompetent, or not sufficiently loyal to the institution;
4. Cold, hard cash. The financial resources commanded by business conglomerates close to the military and other amartaya can be directed for the purposes of alternatively buttressing the position of a Prime Minister through generous donations to the party and to the campaign machines of some of its candidates. If the politician in question is not sufficiently compliant, that money can be withheld to undermine his position within the party. When the need arises, the money can be used for the purposes of out-and-out bribery (e.g., the “Friends of Newin” circa 2008);
5. Influence over the civilian bureaucracy. Powerful civil servants tied to the amartaya for reasons of ideology, kinship, and patronage can make life difficult for the government by dragging their feet in carrying out the government’s instructions;
6. Acts of insubordination by the military, in the form of failure to obey orders (see Somchai) and possibly acts of sabotage (bomb attacks, etc.) designed weaken the Prime Minister or soften his support (with the public, with the coalition, or with his own party) by showing he can’t govern effectively;
7. More or less explicit threats of a coup.
Thaksin was less vulnerable to just about all of these threats because he had more money than God, enjoyed high levels of personal popularity, and had partially succeeded in taking charge of the military, the bureaucracy, and the courts through a variety of means. At the same time, the 1992 massacre had rendered the prospects of military coup less palatable to the public, so the amartaya no longer had that much leverage over him. At the end of the day, they had to remove him. Abhisit, by contrast, is a lot more vulnerable and hence more manipulable. He has no independent power base with the electorate. He has no independent financial base. His coalition is fragile and his position of leadership within the Democrat Party is tenuous. He is under siege, holed up in a military base. And the idea of a coup is not that unrealistic in this context. As such, while Abhisit’s government certainly enjoys some autonomy to set policy on relatively pedestrian matters (as have most civilian governments since the mid-1970s), he cannot afford to ignore the wishes of the amartaya on the big decisions. He might fight them and even win on some occasions, but his position requires that he keep them happy more often than not. Absent that, one way or the other he gets flushed down the toilet.
Federico, for non-red observers all your points appear to be rather shaky, from influence on the courts to media control. It would be a waste of space to rehash the same old arguments here.
Yes, Thaksin and ex-TRT know everything about ammart, they’ve been climbing that ladder for years, never reported a structural problem and still can’t offer any ideas on how to fix it.
Monkey, I doubt troglodytes ever bowed to anyone so that’s not mutually exclusive, and Thaksin took more than his fair share of bows and crawling, completely inappropriate for his status as a citizen with equal rights.
On Abhisit, you seem to ignore that his party got more popular votes on the party list than PPP. He HAS electoral mandate, and a lot more support than you allege.
For the record, my figures for the proportional component (downloaded from the ECT much after the election):
PPP: 12,338,903
DP: 12,148,504
If I’m working with the wrong data I’d like to know.
Wikipedia gives different numbers:
People’s Power Party 14,071,799
Democrat Party 14,084,265
Their source is a broken link, though. On the other hand, no one bothered to correct it in years.
Whatever the actual results are, the margin undermines the claim that Abhisit and PTP have a huge gap in electoral legitimacy, especially considering that party list vote went for overall party policies and leadership, not for local MPs and their expertise.
I think most of the developed world is sympathetic to the call for democracy by the red shirts, but with a little digging around the Leader of the cause comes to the table with very dirty hands.
Thaksin’s success as a businessman stemmed from his policing associates in the first instance, followed by undercutting his American business partner, then this was followed with his phony innocent mistake claim of hiding assets with his household staff, and finally with his unjust personal enrichment of the clan while in office.
My point is simply this — the common man and woman definitely has a cause most would support, but when you sleep with dogs you get fleas. It is time they annexed the cancerous (dare I call him a leader?) Thaksin and find someone honest and upstanding to lead their charge.
Stan: You can download the real figures from http://www.ect.go.th/thai/download51/mp50_report.rar
Last time, I downloaded it, it was PPP 12,331,381 and Dems 12,138,960.
You also realize that Chavalit was heavily involved in the ’92 Black May protests with Chamlong. Interesting Suthep or the other senior Dems aren’t included in yr list of bad politicians.
I don’t think anyone is under the impression that Thailand’s leadership will be free of corruption, patronage, blantant obscurantist tactics in suppressing the ‘thoughts’ of the hoi polloi, once Abhisit is gone, Thaksin is persona non grata, the reds have gone home, and we have a new govenment in place. No, no one would be that naive, would they? The mechanism that has been the status quo in Thai politics and rulership that Khi Kwai delineates in his blogs, books, will not suddenly start exploding in bursts of springs and cogs. That system, i feel, is here to stay a long time. it has the cash, it has clout. same same everywhere. But on a positive note, i feel, Thailand is changing. Thanks in some part to people like Khi Kwai who expose the lies and cunning of those in charge of running the country and in an even greater part to the masses that have started rallying against the inequalities they feel they have had to endure. Of course this has happened before, the masses have rallied and they have been stunned by violence. Nevertheless, in my first decade here i feel a change in society, i feel a people that no longer want to bow in aquiescence when they are told not to ‘ask for more’ or supplicate in fear when the threat of not being a good Buddhist or a good subject looms. The agony of the people won’t go anywhere, but their sight is more clear, more and more people are seeing through the bullshit they’ve been fed for a century. And this clarity, in the long run – paradoxically the leaders of Thailand probaly think differently (I suppose their own personal gain may suffer) – will be good for society, the economy, as the masses become more educated and more important as citizens – not just molecules working for the greater (good) wealth of the chosen few. The noble lie is coming apart by the seams, and in my opinion, that is why all this is worth it.
Do you know how Abhisit wants to change the constitution? Is that public knowledge?
“Do you know how Abhisit wants to change the constitution?”
Slowly. Very slowly.
My big problem with the reds is that, if they really fight for democracy as they claim, how come they never meaningfully criticise Thaksin?
tum|bler:
I agree that this is a problem; not just because I am personally no fan of Mr. Thaksin’s policies/style, but because the failure to distance themselves from Thaksin is perhaps the biggest reason why the reds get some sympathy but no mass participation in Bangkok. At the same time, I understand that the leaders are in a pretty difficult situation, in that if they were to dump Thaksin they might hemorrhage provincial support (which, thus far, it’s the only reason why they are even on the map). Like most movements of this size, the red shirts are a coalition of people with different interests/views, so it makes sense that they would first and foremost try to keep the coalition together. As such, the best way for them to go is probably to distance themselves from Thaksin gradually as opposed to making a more dramatic, clean break. They have done some of this over the past three weeks, but there’s still a long way to go. Incidentally, it is also in Thaksin’s interest (political and financial) to slowly fade away and he is smart enough to know it. The question is whether he can resist the urge to remain in the spotlight…
A very interesting perspective. Thanks for this
i was in Bangkok over the weeekend and while there thought i would ask all the taxi drivers i met what their political opinions were. Needless to say they were all from Issan.
I felt ALL of them realised the inequity in the system that has kept them oppressed for so long. People told me they want real democracy and they want basically more opportunity and money in their towns/villages. Many said they did not like Bangkok nor did they like ‘Bangkok people’. They were all happy to chat with me, one guy even invited me to his house in Roi Et. The feeling is, and it’s not suprising, they get sweet fa from their country while others, mainly the BKK hi-so, swim in money. But not just the money, but the opportunity. Reminds of soemthing Marx said about poverty robbing people of dreams.
I expressed that i was not keen on Thaksin and none of them tried to convince me otherwise, but they did ask me why. They said little for Thaksin’s merit but at least he gave them something – rather than the aforementioend ‘fa’.
Maybe Thaksin is the best of the a bad bunch, as one guy asked me, the Roi Et guy, “well, who should we vote for? Who should lead us?” and of course i answered “mai rue”. Maybe Thaksin is a glimmer of hope and people have had to cling to that glimmer, maybe they don’t want to hear Thaksin criticsed becuase they have clung to a hope that he is the man that will change soemthing. A delusion that happily harbour. And whay not?
Sorry about the typos: late night, post-alcohol, hot. What i think i meant to say is that political leaders often try to take advantage of a disenchanted people and the people put their faith in that leader, sometimes blindly. Look at Germany before the second world war. The hope Thaksin offers the people is not ideal, though perhaps it is better than feeling hopeless.
Great blog mate – some great comments too (Stan G)
thanks
Thanks for that article (and the comments, too). Today’s Guardian article led me here, and then the links you provide made it a long evening …
A week on from the massacre of April 10th and I am sitting here wondering if it is time to finally leave Thailand. The PAD is rallying at Victory Monument; [EDITED] the threatened daily rallies at Victory Circle are really too close for comfort for me because I must work nearby and I am sure their rallies will lead to greater and more violent confrontations. Why do I feel that way and yet don’t feel threatened by the Red Shirts? In part its because I have lived among the Isaan people, married a Roi Et woman, and continue to identify with the Isaan region, and have received friendlier and more generous treatment from these folks; they are much more genuine and free of pretense than Bangkokians. Its also because I haven’t yet been inconvenienced once by the Red Shirt activities since the protests began on March 12th; all of the problems I have had trying to lead a normal life have been the result of the heavy-handed Government response, such as the day the military shut down all the major arteries with concertina wire and troops around the Parliament building, or on April 10th when they moved with lethal force to evict the Red Shirts from the Phan Fa protest site. The PAD have a different track record, as far as I am concerned. There were several incidents in 2008 when I couldn’t get home due to their street actions, and I have never forgiven them for closing down the airports. I have also noticed that the Yellow Shirts had and presumably continue to have a small army of hired thugs who are genuinely frightening and have demonstrated a propensity for violence. Just yesterday a group of 5 of them were arrested in one vehicle for bringing firearms into Bangkok. Yes, I realize that the Red Shirt guards also have the same propensity for violence when provoked, which given the demonstrated imcompetence by the police and troops to prevent mayhem, is exactly what worries me.
A very enlightening article on the current political crisis in Thailand.
The red shirts might have among their ranks a few (or maybe more than a few) violence-prone people but it is the thai government that has certainly demonstrated a propensity to use violence, deadly violence.
I really hope that the current struggle of the red shirts will lead to a truly democratic Thailand. In the long-run that will prove to be beneficial for the greatest majority of thai people, and irrespective of their color preferences…
A very good article and analysis, keep up the good work mate!!
Federico, thanks for a well written article and thanks also to StanG for raising some excellent points. I hope that people reading the article will also refer to Stan’s comments (and your replies) for some balance.
Yes there are problems at the root of the Thai political system which prevent it from being truly democratic but this is a gradual process – ultimately change must come at a cultural level and needs to be supported by the correct political mechanisms. Rushing through patchwork changes to a constitution won’t work. It would be foolish to attempt it.
I hope for a peaceful Red retreat in the next few days/weeks ahead. They have made a statement and it has been costly for all. When the dust settles however people may conclude that the Red shirt action helped to move things along somewhat. Perhaps Abhisit too may yet be rise from the ashes and prove himself to be the right man to shape what comes next.
Thanks all for finally providing most of the relevant points and counterpoints about that crisis in one single page! If I may add my two bits: I had dinner with a Thai journalist two nights ago, she was just back from her Isaan village and had some stunning comments from the farmers there: yes they like the current government, mainly for two good reasons. First it’s telling them not to live above their means when Taksin encouraged them to borrow all the time (quoting her, he said “Look at me, I had a debt of 18 million bahts and now I am a billionaire”). The farmers did borrow, and now lots of land is the hands of the banks – or the local amartaya. And second, because this government actually acted against intermediaries, be them loan sharks or rice buyers – and “erasing” the latter makes a huge difference as you can imagine. Still stunned, I asked her: so they’re gonna vote for the Democrats? Her answer was matter of fact: of course not, the local politician paying them to vote is PPP…
As for violence, the indifference with which Thai people relate to human death always amazes me. 2500 extrajudicial killings, Krue Se, Tak Bai – nobody cares except the victims’ relatives or a few intellectuals, and the opposition of course. And the only recent national outcry was not about the killing contest between army and red shirts and black shirts and whoever else was involved, but when the Chulalongkorn hospital was “invaded” by Seh Daeng!
@Arthurson, sorry but the Red Shirts don’t need to be provoked to be violent. You saw it in Chiangmai when they chased a gay parade, in Bangkok during Songkran when they killed two civilians who didn’t want their tanker next to their houses, in Suphan Buri when they did a Burmese-style raid on Yellow Shirts, on the Songkran attack on what they believed was Abhisit’s car… Though I believe those are not the red shirts mentioned since the start of this discussion who have justified demands, but pawns of the power groups opposed to the current government. But I’m sure you noticed how difficult it was for “political” red shirt leaders to distance themselves from that violence. Because nobody really cares if a few people die, so it doesn’t pay politically to condemn it. I think the “non-violence” mantra is mostly meant for the foreign press, which has been beautifully “played” ever since Taksin was ousted…
เศร้าใจกับคนไทยส่วนใหญ่ที่รักความยุติธรรม แต่หาความยุติธรรมไม่ได้ จากคนที่เรารัก
said unhappy see we are peplo thai die infroon of.You think who not good. I am un happy and not like peplo we r die for gun every time
So sad
Very useful and informative for a person, who has been following the protests and the reaction to it closely.
The last couple of weeks and its culmination today shows, that the powers to be a still well entrenched and Thailand still have a long way to go.
Cheers
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