Thai Culture and Democracy
The battle lines are drawn, in the ongoing fight over Thailand’s grotesque lèse majesté laws. It’s “Western” democracy versus “Thai” culture. In contemporary political discourse, after all, ”culture” is just about the only word whose international currency rivals democracy’s. To be sure, culture commands more respect than the “dictatorship” and “oppression” it is frequently invoked to mask. As a justification for torture, murder, and the arbitrary imprisonment of political opponents, pseudo-cultural arguments are not only effective at home —where they can be tailored to fit just about any narrative about the imperative to protect traditional values from corrupting alien impositions. They also appeal to a sizable constituency of self-loathing Westerners whom third world dictators have somehow turned into their apologists — useful idiots persuaded not only that basic human rights are, indeed, “alienable” but also that championing the right of non-Western peoples to speak their minds or otherwise control their own destiny amounts to doing violence to their cultural heritage.
Whatever the outcome of this fight will be — the ultimate outcome is not in doubt, but it could go either way in the short run — framing the debate in these terms is counterproductive for everyone, on both sides of this fight, who loves the country, its people, and its institutions. Advocates of democracy are much too quick to defer to the brown-nosed apologists of the current regime on the true content of Thai culture. And the defenders of Thailand’s cultural heritage — those for whom cultural discourse is more than just a rhetorical strategy to legitimize an elite’s privileged access to political power — often betray a rather cartoonish view of both the “culture” they seek to defend as well as the alien cultures whose encroachments they so stalwartly oppose.
The key misunderstanding that plagues well-intentioned people on both sides of this pointless debate is that no “culture” is really specific enough to mandate a single regime type, a single form of government, or a single configuration of institutions. This, incidentally, is true of “Thai culture” as much as it is true of the miscellany of cultures crassly lumped together under the all-encompassing “Western” label. And, in the specific case, it is a gross oversimplification — in plain language, a lie — to say that restrictions on anyone’s ability to discuss basic political issues are any more ideally suited to Thailand’s cultural values than they would be to those of any country in the West.
Lest we forget, most places in Western Europe were ruled by more or less absolute monarchs for much longer than Thailand has been — not to mention much longer than they themselves have been “democratic.” Democratization not only constitutes a very recent development in countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. As recently as four or five decades ago, it was rather common to suspect that democracy was destined to fail in countries distinguished by the “parochial” and “subject” political cultures prevalent in southern Europe. Participatory, pluralist institutions, it was thought, are unlikely to work properly in contexts where citizens are generally passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites. Interestingly, these are more or less the same arguments made about Thailand’s supposed incompatibility with “Western” democracy.
Lest we forget, moreover, it’s in the country with arguably the proudest republican tradition in Europe — France — that the model of royal absolutism originates. Indeed, it is from French-style absolutism that King Chulalongkorn the Great borrowed heavily in his attempt to build the kind of modern state that Thailand still lacked as of the mid-nineteenth century. Is “republicanism” any more compatible with French culture than “royalism?” To be sure, few people would have argued as much in 1788. Yet, that’s exactly what France got in 1792. The fact is that “French culture” prescribes neither. French culture has given rise to, and has in turn been re-shaped by, both royalist and republican ideas.
Just as there is nothing especially “democratic” about Western culture, it could be argued that Thai culture is not quite as unfriendly to so-called “Western” democracy as it is often made out to be. In fact, there are at least three inconvenient facts that undermine the argument that the lèse majesté legislation is merely the legal expression of foundational, long-held values more integral to Thai culture than is the unfettered expression of political ideas.
First, it’s not really true that Thai culture is historically any more “undemocratic” than most “Western” cultures. It could be argued, as famous social critic Sulak Sivaraksa did twenty years ago, that Thai society came to embody the ideals of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” five hundred years before the French ever came up with that slogan. Way back in the thirteenth century, the people who lived in the kingdom of Sukhothai experienced levels of equality and freedom vastly superior to those most Europeans enjoyed at the time [UPDATE: Exactly how "free" they were is in dispute; see the exchanges in the comments below]. Consider this passage from the venerable Ramkhamhaeng inscription (dated 1292 CE). At a time when most Westerners lived as serfs — essentially the property of feudal overlords — King Ramkhamhaeng had these words inscribed on his throne:
In the time of King Ramkhamhaeng this land of Sukhothai is thriving. There is fish in the water and rice in the fields. The lord of this realm does not levy toll on his subjects for traveling the roads; they lead their cattle to trade or ride their horses to sell; whoever wants to trade in elephants, does so; whoever wants to trade in horses, does so; whoever wants to trade in silver or gold, does so. [...] When commoners or men of rank differ and disagree, [the King] examines the case to get at the truth and settles it justly for them. He does not connive with thieves or favor concealers [of stolen goods]. When he sees someone’s rice he does not covet it; when he sees someone’s wealth he does not get angry. [...] When he captures enemy warriors, he does not kill them or beat them. He has hung a bell in the opening of the gate over there: if any commoner in the land has a grievance which sickens his belly and gripes his heart, and which he wants to make known to his ruler and lord, it is easy: he goes and strikes the bell which the King has hung there; King Ramkhamhaeng, the ruler of the kingdom, hears the call; he goes and questions the man, examines the case, and decides it justly for him. So the people of this muang of Sukhothai praise him. [Translation in David K. Wyatt, Studies in Thai History, p. 54-55.]
The Ramkhamhaeng inscription contrasts sharply with contemporary accounts of life in medieval Europe as well as with the model of political and social organization that became dominant in Siam with the rise of Ayutthaya. It describes a strikingly egalitarian society where the king’s subjects were remarkably equal under the law and free to pursue economic activities of their own choosing. It describes a society ruled by an accessible king, one who is confident enough in his own position to routinely lower himself to the level of his subjects to adjudicate their disputes. The king is accorded praise and respect not simply qua inherently superior being, but because of what he does for his people. Historian David K. Wyatt suggests that King Ramkhamhaeng self-consciously defined the administration of the Tai kingdom of Sukhothai in contrast to the more hierarchical, more unequal, more obsessively ritualistic Khmer kingdoms ruled by self-styled “gods.” With the rise of Ayutthaya, however, it was the very Khmer practices Ramkhamhaeng looked upon as bastardizations of Tai culture —slavery, Brahmanism, sakdina, and devaraja rule — that ultimately won out. Incidentally, that’s in part the reason why fanatical nationalists in Thailand are obsessed with Khmer ruins like Phra Viharn (and even Angkor). After all, it is only by claiming ownership of Khmer traditions that they can avoid acknowledging the fact that some of the key organizing principles of modern Thai society are no less foreign than the Western “impositions” they so valiantly resist.
The second inconvenient truth is that no such thing as Thailand existed (whether as a political entity or even merely as an idea) as of two centuries ago. Not only is present-day Thailand essentially a negative construct — it includes contiguous territories in mainland Southeast Asia left over from French and British colonization. The rulers in Ayutthaya and then Bangkok never really controlled much beyond the Chaophraya basin and the country’s eastern seaboard prior to the nineteenth century. When they did come to control what is now Thailand’s north, south and vast sections of the outer northeast, it was not by plebiscite or popular insurrection that these territories gave their allegiance to the King of Siam. It was rather by conquest and skillful political maneuvering. Parts of northern Thailand, for instance, were essentially brought under Siamese control in exchange for bailing the Lanna rulers out of the debts they had incurred with European trading companies. As such, how much sense does it really make to speak of a single Thai culture? How can whatever Thai national identity the people of Udon Thani, Chiang Mai, and Nakhorn Si Thammarat share be understood without reference to the homogeneity enforced by the authorities in Bangkok through sustained propaganda and a good deal of violence — not to mention the most careless disregard for traditional local customs? And how really “natural,” “sacred,” or otherwise worthy of insulation from domestic debate (not to mention “foreign” ideas) should we presume that single, national identity to be?
Third, it has escaped many on both sides of this debate that lèse majesté legislation as it is currently interpreted and enforced is not something that has existed in Thailand from time immemorial. In fact, at least with respect to the monarchy, the Thai press was immeasurably more free a century ago than it is today. For much of their rule, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) and King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) — whose job description, it should be noted, was “absolute” (not “constitutional”) monarch — were subjected to vicious criticism and sometimes pointed derision by the local press. And though repression was intermittently applied, the Thai journalists of the time could afford to be much more than the neutered bunch of sycophants they have now become. By contemporary standards — in an obscurantist time when restrained, somewhat apologetic articles in the Economist pass for mortal affronts — the cartoons and editorials routinely printed in the pages of early twentieth century Thai newspapers are genuinely shocking. Scott Barmé’s book Man, Woman, Bangkok provides an especially compelling illustration.
Once again, these considerations point to the conclusion that there is nothing especially “Thai” about lèse majesté. The legislation itself has little to do with Thai culture. In fact, Thai society had shown itself mature enough to tolerate, for decades prior to the more recent restrictions, open discussion of the monarchy. Lèse majesté is rather but a quintessentially modern instrument of repression that leaders like Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat instituted to stifle political debate about the very content of Thai cultural values and identity. It exists not to defend Thai culture, but to enforce the vulgar, comic-book version of Thainess the military and bureaucratic elites have produced and propagated to advance no cause greater than their own aggrandizement. In this sense, those in Thailand and abroad who defend lèse majesté legislation on cultural grounds would do well to read some Thai history before they accuse foreign observers of ignorance and Thai dissidents of apostasy.
Also lost in this idiotic juxtaposition of “Thai culture” and “Western democracy” is that, far from being incompatible, cultures (Thai or otherwise) need dissidents to survive. The practices, traditions, values, beliefs, and institutions typically associated with culture can only hope to endure through the kind of constant renewal which requires of a society the courage to come to terms with its history and the willingness to engage in discussions however unpleasant or divisive. John Stuart Mill famously argued that it is in the interest of any society (or culture) to protect the expression of ideas that a majority of the population might find revolting:
“If the opinion [of the minority] is right, they [the majority] are deprived of the opportunity to exchange error for truth; if [the opinion of the minority is] wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit — the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error” (Mill, On Liberty).
As Mill’s reasoning suggests, it’s only under the most stultifying of censorship regimes that slobbering retards like Thanong Khantong are paid to write opinion columns in major national publications.
PS: My apologies to regular readers for the long hiatus, but my day job hasn’t allowed me to spend much time on this blog of late.
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Brilliant bi-polar propositions again from realism-scholar KhiKwai.
Both sides of the “silly” fence are all-too-well demarcated, including all of the still-bleeding-issues in between.
It could be a case of self-imposed political agoraphobia dressed up as cultural protectionism, a memento from the nationalists.
thanks, excellent article
was worth waiting for….
Fine argument, and the general point is well taken and hard to deny, in my opinion. Points two and three are especially strong. Point one though seems to me quite off the mark. To argue that the political philosophy of a mandala-creating ruler of the 13th century is democratic in anything like the modern liberal constitutional sense seems ridiculous to me. And a comparison with 13th century France – either as ideology or reality (and are we keeping these straight in this comparison?)- would demand a good bit more evidence than you provide. And the comparison with the Khmer empire seems equally off the mark. Literally speaking in Wyatt’s terms at least, less hierarchical doesn’t mean egalitarian! More importantly, you seem to have simply swallowed as fact the easy pejorative stereotypes of Khmers in the modern Thai religio-national imaginary in general, and Sulak’s particular brand of Siamese Buddhist valorization in particular. As if all the terrible distortions in some originary egalitarian Siamese Buddhist culture (in the singular and determinative, mind you!)were the result of corruptions by outsiders, like those vile Brahmanical Khmers. As if Siamese Theravada Buddhism didn’t go hand in hand with hierarchical political orderings of the social world and legitimation of (violent) rulers who dominated that world.
Your argument works perfectly well simply relying on points two and three, and in fact both of those general analytical stances should be critically applied to the pseudo-historical ridiculousness of Thai Buddhist modernists you serve up in point one!
Erick: Of course, you are quite right that Sukhothai was not “democratic” in the contemporary sense of the word. My point is that what Amartya Sen calls “the roots of democracy” — a measure of equality under the law, free debate, etc. — can be found in Thai history well before the more repressive aspects so dear to self-style purists had taken hold. To be sure, I did not speak of medieval Western society in detail here (the literature on the subject is quite extensive and easily available), but I nonetheless would submit to you that no European ruler in the thirteenth century would have described his society in quite the terms Ramkhamaeng did. As for the “Khmerization” of Thai political and social organization, I certainly have nothing against Khmer culture; and, in fact, Thai culture and society today can hardly be understood without reference to the way it has assimilated values, traditions, and beliefs from outside. However, because (as you noted) Thai nationalists today do have a problem with everything Khmer, I was trying to point out that, ironically, much of what they hold dear about “Thai culture” was in fact borrowed from the Khmer.
Thanks for another interesting piece.
From a practical point of view, I look at it this way:
1. If the LM law is abolished, that would offend a number of Thai’s (current Thai’s, irrespective of what certain, or many, Thai’s may have thought in the past)- some will be more offended than others, but I think it is clear that the numbers who would be offended is not insignificant.
2. If the LM law remains unchanged, this will offend a number of Thai’s, and foreigners :~)
(I don’t think the relative strength of each group is that important, because IMO both are significant)
3. If there is a way in which the LM could be amended which can be explained in such a way that it that offends only the most hard core elements of both groups, then such an amendment would be the most appropriate couse of action at this point in time in Thailand’s development (or decline).
But Kwai Jok Foong,
You don’t seem to understand the cultural-cum-religious ideological project of folks like Sulak when they make the argument you paraphrase. He, and other modernist Buddhists with a romanticized, nostalgic vision of Siamese culture and Buddhism prior to the impact of Khmer culture, argue that true Siamese culture and religion was what existed before Khmer influence. And that more specifically, the ancient “democracy” of the Siamese was founded in the inherent, originary democratic spirit and practice of the Buddhist Sangha, before its corruption by the hierarchical, ritualistic, authoritarian Brahmanically-dominated Khmer culture. This is a very common trope of all sorts of contemporary Thai Buddhist intellectuals, in fact. For Sulak, what is dear about Siamese Buddhism was surely not borrowed from the Khmers. For Sulak, ancient Sukhothai and ancient Siamese Buddhism was democratic in the modern sense, at least in “essence” or “spirit”. But this is empirically invalid, I would assert, if one critically and carefully reads the existing historiographic record regarding the insitutional and ideological life of Buddhism in India or elsewhere in Asia.
My point is that Buddhism is just like culture in the terms you describe it – neither inherently inclined towards democratic or authoritarian impulses. Moreover, the history is very messy, and actually in practice Buddhism is quite compatible, typically so in fact, with regards to authoritarian and hierarchical institutional arrangements. And that it has been this ambivalent and this compromised since the beginning of the existing historiographic record starting in India. This is not an assertion that I think Sulak, or others, would accept. And it certainly serves the rhetorical and strategic interests of Thai liberal democrats to be able to find some indigenous source of democracy that predates contact with the modern West. But invented traditions and historiographic simplicity are just that from the perspective of scholars, and should be called out as such. This may make advancing a democratic liberal project harder, but so be it I’m afraid.
And frankly we know next to nothing about the institutional forms, dynamics and character of the Sukhothai kingdom, beyond a few public descriptions by elites. It isn’t clear to me how we could easily characterize it with any specificity. Why would we make claims about historical reality based on public propaganda? I mean, that is what the inscription is, correct? It would be like evaluating a political party’s policies based on its press releases. So a) I don’t believe one can make the claims you do, b) I don’t agree with your interpretation of the historical evidence (King Ramkamhaeng as cao and imperial ruler equated himself with his subjects??), and c) I don’t think this claim is necessary for the larger point you are advancing in your post.
Erick: Thank you for adding your thoughtful comments to this discussion. I would suggest, however, that we are more in agreement here than the previous exchanges might suggest. First, I am quite familiar with the philosophical outlook and political agenda of Sulak — neither of which I particularly share. However, the reason why he was quoted here is simply to point out (as you noted) that even indigenous readings of history and culture are contested. Whatever one might think of Ayutthaya’s government and society, moreover, it is important to reiterate that it constitutes a departure from previous, indigenous forms of social and political organization — reflecting the assimilation of the very “foreign” practices whose influence the defenders of the status quo now decry.
On whether the ideology and the practice of government in Sukhothai really matched, I suspect that things weren’t quite as idyllic as the inscription suggests (as you mentioned, we don’t have enough historical evidence to go on). However, that’s not exactly central to the argument. Whether or not, in particular, Ramkhamhaeng really governed as described in the inscription, the fact that he felt the need to provide a legitimation of his rule in those terms speaks to the prevalence of these values in the society he led. To be sure, aside from their actual behavior, the rulers of Ayutthaya would have hardly considered it appropriate to describe the relationship with their subjects in those terms (I would suggest, neither would have thirteenth-century European feudal lords). That itself indicates a subsequent shift in worldview away from more egalitarian ideals (if perhaps not actual practices).
Please quit your day job.
As a keen, “trainee” amateur student, forever learing about Thai history(and Thailand in general), I would like to thank ,Khi Kwai and Erick, for their most informative discussion.
It is so refreshing, to read such well informed comments, rather than the often petty and ignorant “debates” about Thailand.
These sorts of discussions, should take place more often; outside the “hallowed halls”, of a Thai Studies group, at an institute of “higher learning”- where I presume they take place frequently?
Not being able to read Thai, I do not know, but I would also hope, there are similar levels of knowledgable debate, taking place on other blogs and forums, in the Thai language, as well ?
Gentlemen, thank you!
Doug: I would quit, but I have people to take care of. Besides, that cheque I expected to receive after I joined this nefarious “international conspiracy” never quite made it. Must have gotten lost in the mail.
Kwai Jok Foong,
I have no doubt that on the large interpretive issues of the contemporary moment and claims regarding the appropriateness (or not) of democracy to “Thai culture” we are in broad agreement. But regarding the interpretation of the historical past I’m not so sure.
First, in your original post under your first point before you get to the specific example of the Ramkamhaeng inscription you assert: “Way back in the thirteenth century, the people who lived in the kingdom of Sukhothai experienced levels of equality and freedom vastly superior to those most Europeans enjoyed at the time.” I simply don’t know how you can make such a claim given the paucity of existing historical data. You have clarified in your subsequent comments that perhaps things weren’t as rosy in reality as proclaimed in the inscription. But the whole reason for you advancing your discussion of the inscription is as evidence of the more general quoted claim above. So my question is this – what are the historical sources from which you derive this conclusion about the experiential levels of equality and freedom enjoyed by those living under Sukhothai rule? And is the above quotation from your original post a claim you yourself are advancing (which is how I read it) or an example of the contested historical claims of Thai intellectuals? From my reading, it seems to me that your first point in your post is all about a substantive assertion of comparative liberty, equality and fraternity in 13th century Sukhothai vs. France, and not about either the rhetoric of its political elites or a comparison between Sukhothai and Ayuthaya as you assert in your comments. In your opinion, did in fact Ramkamhaeng discover liberty, equality, and fraternity 500 years before the French?
The reason why I press this point so strongly is that to my eyes your strategic use of Sulak’s (and others) assertions in order to suggest that perhaps democracy is not so foreign to modern Thailand after all dangerously buys into and reproduces a whole raft of conservative and royalist themes and unstated assumptions about the past that run directly counter to your substantive and analytic stance in points two and three of your argument. By raising up the Sukhothai moment as a positive exemplar (in contrast to the later historical epochs of Ayuthaya or the Chakris, or whatever) you seem to essentially agree with many modernist Siamese / Thai intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries who sought to apologize for absolutist and royalist rule precisely by pointing to some (idealized, romanticized) originary moment of benevolent, enlightened, egalitarian rule under Ramkamhaeng (but who nonetheless simultaneously would not go so far, as Sulak does, to argue that this was an endorsement of democracy per se). The claims you advance seem to unintentionally, to my eyes, buy into the foundational dualisms and tropes underlying a whole series of apologetic re-readings of the historical past by 19th and 20th century Siamese / Thai intellectuals faced with the counterclaims of Western colonialism – free vs. dominated, indigenous vs. foreign, egalitarian vs. hierarchical, rational vs. ritualistic, etc. But all those intellectuals have done really, in fact, is to invert the claims of the Westerners and to assert that the Thais achieved all of these so-called Western modern (i.e. colonial) values and achievements long before the West themselves. So what does the West have to teach them after all? How could they claim that the Siamese or Thai are uncivilized? Quite frankly, your first point in your post simply seems to me to be regurgitating this long-standing conservative and apologetic stance. And if it is not, I don’t see how your use of these claims is any different, and would appreciate you showing me how it is different.
So another larger question I have is this – why is it important to find some historical precursor of democratic values in pre-modern Siamese society and culture? Does it make the project of democratization somehow less viable or legitimate if there are none? From my perspective neither Sukhothai nor Ayuthaya (nor Lanna, nor Lan Xang, nor any other pre-modern Southeast Asian polity) were democratic in anything like the modern understanding of that term, either ideologically or substantively. You may have had more or less authoritarian, hierarchical or centralized projects of empire building, but none were advancing a political project of democratization, in any shape or form. This is a modern project, and one will have to find justifications for it outside of claims that there are foundational values buried deep in the Thai historical consciousness that are essentially or in spirit in accordance with democracy.
Let’s just admit that it constitutes a point of rupture in political consciousness (and one moreover provoked by the encounter with a series of imperfect Western arguments, claims and forms), and get on with the task of legitimating and building it now and in the present for contemporary Thai citizens. Because if you have to find a historical precursor or essence for every modern project of change, then one is in deep trouble in a place like Thailand where the conservative, elite (and since the 50s royalist) historical imagination has so dominantly seized the historiographic terrain as its own.
I’m sure you’re adding to the academic literature as well. I’ve seen some of your writing there and will continue watching for it and enjoying it, both here and there.
Erick asked: “So my question is this – what are the historical sources from which you derive this conclusion about the experiential levels of equality and freedom enjoyed by those living under Sukhothai rule? ”
I based this on 1) The contemporaneous accounts of Sukhothai that appear not only in the Ramkhamhaeng inscription, but also in the Traiphum Phra Ruang by King Lithai (especially the part that deals with the “Realm of Men”) and the “Three Sukhothai Oaths of Allegiance” David K. Wyatt analyzes in his Studies in Thai History; 2) The analysis of these documentary sources that appear in a) David K. Wyatt’s discussion of the authenticity of the Ramkhamhaeng inscription and its content in both Studies in Thai History (pp. 48-58 and pp. 59-68) and Thailand: A Short History (pp. 41-49; b) Peter A. Jackson’s discussion of the Traiphum appearing in National Identity and Its Defenders by Craig J. Reynolds (Ch. 7); and c) Frank E. Reynolds and Mani B. Reynolds’ “Introduction” to the Traiphum (Published in 1982 as Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology by the Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, pp. 5-41).
The picture that emerges from these sources is perhaps less of a “democratic” society than of one that is still distinguished by low levels of internal differentiation. I do, however, stand by the original comment you refer to (”Way back in the thirteenth century, the people who lived in the kingdom of Sukhothai experienced levels of equality and freedom vastly superior to those most Europeans enjoyed at the time”) in this sense. From what we know of Sukhothai circa the late 13th century, the key division in society was simply between chao and commoner. Most Europeans of the time, however, were not merely “commoners,” but were rather serfs — people who were essentially a part of more or less large manorial estates, tied to their overlords by life-long labor obligations, endowed with neither any semblance of political rights nor the freedom to leave the manor. In short, they were more akin to the property of their overlords than what we consider “citizens” today. And, once again, beyond the “experiential” levels of equality and freedom, I think it’s important to note the difference between the “proto-democratic” values emerging from documents such as the Ramkhamhaeng inscription with both European feudalism as well as the worldview that became prevalent in Siam with the rise of Ayutthaya.
Thank you for the excellent ongoing articles. Additionally the reader comments provide hope that all here are not the embarrassing brain dead found on some forums. The neural exercise is a nice respite from the daily overload of unfettered mediocrity.
Sorry to have a rather negative opinion…
It makes no sense to compare different period of times… You oppose France before 1789 with France after 1789. And then France in the 18th century with Thailand now…
Please tell me, what does it mean when you say :
“Lest we forget, most places in Western Europe were ruled by more or less absolute monarchs for much longer than Thailand has been”
Sure. France is a much older country than Thailand. And then, what’s your point ? Before France, we had the romans. Before them, the egyptians… How long we go back like this ?
It’s like to say : Egypt was not a democratic country in 2500 BC, therefore Thailand doesn’t have to be democratic now.
Another example :
First, it’s not really true that Thai culture is historically any more “undemocratic” than most “Western” cultures. It could be argued, as famous social critic Sulak Sivaraksa did twenty years ago, that Thai society came to embody the ideals of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” five hundred years before the French ever came up with that slogan.
So okay, 500 years ago, Thailand invented the slogan “liberty, equality, and fraternity”. Great. I’m thrilled by emotion. And then ?
The real question is : could Thailand, today, can abide by this motto ?
It’s the only real and interesting (and disturbing) question.
I have found many arguments about current political affdairs are dismissed by some as foreigners not understanding “thainess”.
This article looks back for some historic definition. However, like JohnA, I am looking for current explanations and hopefully solutions.
My understanding now is that Thailand is “different” because, like Burma, the military has strengthened their hold on business and politics in Thailand unlike most other societies (worth comparing) where the military are subjugated to civilian political control.
In Thailand, unlike Burma, the military have achieved this by using the Monarchy and its popular appeal as cover. Why the Thai [...SENTENCE REDACTED: WHAT I WOULD SAY TO THIS DAVID IS THAT IN WAS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.]
How in Europe and other developed societies did the civilian politicians manage to subjugate the military? How did they enforce rules such as no public servants, including the military, can engage in private business while serving? How did they enforce rules that the military are not permitted to engage in actions against their own people?
Why, in Thailand, has [...SENTENCE REDACTED: AGAIN, DAVID, I THINK THIS SPEAKS TO SYMBIOSIS; A CERTAIN CONTROVERSIAL BOOK HAS ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS]
On this last point, I would support (the Netherlands?) Les Majeste where:
- charges can be brought only by a senior member of the Royal Family who claims to be affected,
- all facts of the case and proceedings are published and,
- like ordinary defamation, truth is a defence,
- trial by jury of Thai citizens is required,
- punishments fit the crime and are proportionate.
Kwai Jok Foong,
Thanks for the clarity on the sources of your interpretation. It does strike me, I must admit, that from my perspective we still are working with sources that are both a) limited in number and b) highly biased towards elite perspectives. I am not competent enough to comment on the distinction between Siamese commoners and medieval European serfs, but for the sake of argument, I will concede that with Sukhothai we are dealing with more limited degrees of hierarchical inequality and internal social differentiation than in established kingdoms like Angkor. I don’t think this should be surprising, as Sukhothai was essentially a rebellious region of a weakened Angkorian mandala-empire that successfully managed to achieve political autonomy from its overlord. This ‘egalitarianism’ was both a rhetoric of appeal and a reflection of the reduced capacity of elites to foster and demand starker hierarchical distinctions.
My problem is interpreting reduced hierarchical inequality and social differentiation as emblematic of either democratic or proto-democratic cultural-cum-political values. It is worth pointing out, however, that other (earlier) scholars have been much less hesitant. Sulak clearly believes Sukhothai was democratic, while Wyatt is also inclined in this direction as well. In one of his last works when discussing the reasons for the revolt of Sukhothai, he states: “This ripe medieval Buddhism simultaneously boosted the individual’s responsibility for his or her own salvation (through merit-making and religious self-awakening) and validated and strengthened the bonds that held the society together – socially through a maze of rituals and the exchange of personnel between the laity and the Buddhist monkhood, and politically by stressing open consensus-building (even democratic governance) by exposing most young men to the internal governance of the monkhood.” (David Wyatt, “Relics, oaths and politics in thirteenth-century Siam”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 32,1 (2001), p. 63). You will note here, again, the laying of the indigenous roots of democratic governance, individualism and other “modern” (political) principles at the doorstep of (Theravada) Buddhism – a claim I believe should be subject to greater critical examination than is commonly provided.
So my question is really this, I suppose: What exactly and specifically are these proto-democratic values? Surely minimal hierarchy is not enough. In an earlier comment you mentioned Sen’s equality under the law and free debate. Are there others that serve as a diagnostic marker and which one can find evidence of (even if only rhetorically) in either the Ramkamhaeng inscription or the Traiphum? But even more importantly than finding something resembling these discrete values, in what sense can one argue that a) these values are significantly similar to how they are understood in a modern constitutional liberal democracy?, and b) that in combination they form a complete whole that inclines towards democratic governance as we now understand and advance it? It seems to me that the crux of the matter lies precisely in how select discrete values and institutional requirements are synergistically articulated into an emergent whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Democratic governance doesn’t simply reside in rule of law, free elections, the separation of powers, freedom of speech, etc, but how – under the force of a particular history and conditionality – they are articulated together into an integrated, cohesive, meaningful and functional whole inclined towards certain abstract ideals. I find it hard to imagine that even if one could defend the presence of proto-democratic values in Sukhothai, that one could also argue that their articulation and trajectory are inclined as a whole towards anything resembling modern democratic governance. I mean, after all, where is the idea of radical egalitarianism and sovereignty residing with the people under the terms of a social contract to be found in a social formation that treats its rulers as of a different order from the commoner masses?
And this raises the second set of question I previously asked – “why is it important to find some historical precursor of democratic values in pre-modern Siamese society and culture? Does it make the project of democratization somehow less viable or legitimate if there are none?” Which is also to ask “just exactly how much mileage can one get out of discovering discrete proto-democratic values in the pre-modern Siamese world?”. Because I certainly don’t think you can find an articulated, holistic package of pre-modern Siamese political values that points definitively or logically towards the ideals of democratic governance now at play and in debate in the modern world of capitalist nation-states. And if you can only endorse those contemporary democratic values that have pre-modern precedents and echoes, then the contemporary political project one is advancing is necessarily going to be truncated and distorted. Which is also to say, a democratizing project must, in my opinion, accept that it is calling for rupture in the political consciousness and institutional order from what has come before. But that sort of claim is harmed by efforts to make democracy appealing to Thais by stating that they actually were democratic a long time ago but seem to have fallen away from it somehow. Thais were never seriously or substantively democratic in the modern sense in the pre-modern past, in my opinion, and this fact shouldn’t be obscured. The true challenge needs to be faced and not finessed. They are therefore being asked to think anew the foundations of their social and political associations and life, and to create a new world on the basis of that rethinking. It is that revolutionary, and calls for a Thai-style democracy all too often degenerate into efforts to avoid the full scope and demands of that challenge.
Erick: Many thanks for your questions, which speak to some important issues the two previous commenters (JohnA and David Brown) also raised. Alas, my day job is calling, so I’ll get back to you on this later this evening (SE Asian time).
Erick: Let me address your second set of questions first and then make my way back to the initial set of concerns you raised. Specifically, you asked:
“Why is it important to find some historical precursor of democratic values in pre-modern Siamese society and culture? Does it make the project of democratization somehow less viable or legitimate if there are none?”
The way I see it, it is not especially relevant to find historical precursors of democratic values; moreover, the project of democratization is neither less viable nor less legitimate if said precursors are not found. My view of culture — “political culture,” as opposed to the kind of cultural traditions that just led me to shamelessly stuff my face with half a pound of lasagne — is that it is largely epiphenomenal to existing power asymmetries. To put it in plain language, culture does not explain power (or a country’s configuration of institutions); it is rather power that makes culture (more on this here). As such, I tend not to accord culture — especially those aspects of culture that legitimize various forms of oppression — any “sanctity” or special status. And, as such, whether or not democracy (or aspects thereof) is suitable to Thailand (or any other country) does not in the least hinge upon its compatibility with the local “culture,” but rather on whether it might be of any use to improving the lives of its citizens (in material terms or otherwise). In other words, I tend to see “democracy” as any innovation that originates anywhere in the world; the criterion for its adoption should not be its continuity with previous practice, but rather its potential for making things better.
This, perhaps, should be especially the case of Thailand. Prince Damrong, the so-called “father of Thai history,” famously claimed that Thai culture is defined by its extraordinary ability to assimilate aspects of foreign cultures. Specifically, Prince Damrong maintained that: “The Tai [unclear to me whether he means Tai or Thai here] knew how to pick and choose. When they saw some good feature in the culture of other people, if it was not in conflict with their own interests, they did not hesitate to borrow it and adapt it to their own requirements” (cited, for instance, in: Maurizio Peleggi. 2007. Thailand: The Worldly Kingdom. p. 10). And so they did. Everything from devaraja rule to sakdina, from Theravada Buddhism to royal absolutism, from nationalist ideology to developmental policy was borrowed and adapted from abroad. As Damrong noted, the only criterion that guided the introduction of these innovations (and countless others) was simply whether their adoption was in the “interest” of “the Tai” (or, more plausibly, those who happened to be in charge at the time). If pre-existing local practices constituted no obstacle to the introduction of these innovations, they should similarly be considered no obstacle to the introduction of democracy. In fact, the real hindrance to democratization in Thailand is not Thai culture, but rather the interests of elites who are otherwise eager to borrow from abroad what can be used to entrench their power at home. [More on this in a previous post]
So why even bother to look for “proto-democratic values” in Thai history? The answer is that, for better or worse, pseudo-cultural justifications of authoritarianism have a lot of currency in contemporary discourse. So going back in time to analyze the history of both Thailand and “the West” is useful because it helps us draw attention to two fallacies upon which these claims are based.
The first misperception is that democracy is but the seamless extension of “Western culture” — hence the crude notion of “Western democracy.” History shows that this is simply not the case. Democracy may have been primarily a Western accomplishment, but it’s a very recent one. There as in most other places, democratization was the result of bloody, epochal struggles in which the people had to wrest every single right they now enjoy out of the hands of those who defended much more “traditional” forms of rule (whose track record in the West is much longer than democracy’s). My own grandfather spent two years in a Nazi concentration camp as a result of the resistance that traditionally entrenched elites put up against democratic change in parts of Europe. In this sense, the history of “democracy” in Western Europe is not unlike the history of democracy in Thailand. It is not the logical extension of established cultural values; it was rather taken from the cold, dead hands of an ultimately doomed, but extremely recalcitrant old order that refused to give up without a fight. The calls for a “New Politics” in Thailand today are a reflection of the very same elite resistance that brought upon my own country the scourge of Mussolini.
The second misperception is that there is anything especially “undemocratic” about Thailand’s culture or history (or, more generally, the culture and history of any “non-Western” society) compared to the culture and history of “the West.” In this regard, going back in time serves the purpose of both: 1) Underscoring the selective reading of history underlying the notion that there is anything “natural” about the status quo; and 2) Pointing out that local cultures are, indeed, no more “incompatible” with democracy than Western culture once was. In the specific instance, evidence that ideas emphasizing equality under the law and individual freedom had won enough acceptance in 13th century Thailand to warrant explicit acknowledgment by someone like King Ramkhamhaeng — at a time when most Europeans lived as serfs, not to mention before the introduction of more familiar socio-political hierarchies in Siam itself — may not make Thailand any more ideally suited to democracy than any other country in the world. But, then again, it points to the fact that there is nothing especially “natural” about the status quo and the illiberal provisions currently defending it. Nor, for that matter, is there anything especially “unnatural” about ideas like equality under the law, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press.
The bottom line, as I noted elsewhere, is that no culture or civilization is inherently “friendly” or “unfriendly” to democracy. Its adoption invariably signifies a departure from some established political traditions and continuity with others — just as it did in the West, where it won out over more familiar, more traditional forms of government through much blood, sweat, and tears. Going back in history, in this sense, demonstrates nothing about the wisdom of democratization. It just serves to highlight the crude and self-serving nature of popular rationalizations of the status quo grounded in pseudo-cultural, pseudo-historical reasoning. And to expose these excuses for what they are is also to move the discussion to terrain that is far more inhospitable to the opponents of democratization. Once the thin veneer of “culture” behind which reactionaries hide is stripped away, it becomes incumbent upon them to explain why the Thai people should be denied the right to speak their mind and elect governments of their own choosing.
Incidentally, many thanks to everyone who has posted comments on this and other entries. The reason why I love running this blog is not much that it gives me a forum where I can impart knowledge on others — as the name of this site itself suggests, I have no such expectation; as the number of views each post gets demonstrates, the blog’s reach is nothing to brag about. It is rather that it offers me an opportunity to learn — learning by researching and writing posts as well as learning by reflecting upon other people’s comments (whether positive or negative). Indeed, I find in working on this site a reaffirmation for the very “ideological agenda” — in one word, democratization — the site was meant to pursue. As Amartya Sen has written, the essence of democracy is unfettered public debate. Discussions such as those above provide me with a very personal demonstration of how valuable open debate can be to one’s personal growth (in this case, my own).
Kwai Jok Foong,
Fair enough and well argued. I do not disagree with your central substantive assertions. On the margins of course I have a different perspective. I wouldn’t argue that culture is so strongly epiphenomenal as you, but there is probably not much to be gained by going into a long, detailed discussion of just what I mean by “culture” vs. “power”, etc. The syncretic, assimilative character of Thai culture seems less a uniquely Thai feature to me, than a uniquely Thai rhetorical claim that tends to hide much more than it reveals (what is assimilated vs. what is rejected?, who is assimilating and who is rejecting?, etc.).
I fully understand the strategic value of unearthing proto-democratic values in the Thai past as you present it. I suppose where I differ from you is that I also perceive considerable risks in the exercise as well. One risk lies in a subtle slippage of category error. To talk about equality under the law and individual freedom in the Sukhothai era without constantly placing “proto-”, at least, in front of those claims still seems problematic to me. And I don’t think this is merely nit-picking over semantics. “Equality”, “law”, “freedom”, “individual” – these are all incredibly loaded terms with specific, if contested, meanings and significances after the rise of the ideology of liberalism and the practice of constitutional political orders, within the frame of the nation-state as the collective community of fate, under the constraints of a capitalist order of production. None of those specific associations and meanings are so relevant to the cultural actors and institutions at work in the Sukhothai era. Pragmatically and institutionally, they don’t exist in their modern contested forms in Sukhothai, and that historical gap and rupture needs to be firmly kept in mind, in my opinion.
A second risk however lies in how semantically loose claims like this can reinforce conservative, even authoritarian, political projects. Without that semantic and analytic precision, it seems to me much easier for conservative elites to use implications of continuity as a shield against full democratic reform and change. And the argument can easily go something like this: Thais have long known, understood and practiced democracy, just without this fetishistic emphasis on individual rights, contested elections, and loathing of monarchic sovereignty. This is Thai-style democracy, so don’t pollute our great democratic heritage with foreign ideas. It seems to me this is the clear implication and direction of Sulak’s argument, and of many other Thai intellectuals. It is not a surprising stance, given the incredibly ambivalent attitudes towards many features of “Western modernity” in a post-colonial twentieth and twenty-first century world. And this of course opens up into the whole issue of diverse forms of democratic governance, the localization of globalized “universal” institutions and practices, and the boundary limits of certain concepts like democracy.
So I guess my final question is this: do you think these concerns about rhetorical and strategic risks of your argument are unreasonable?
Erick: I think the concerns you raised are very reasonable. In fact, I probably should have been more circumspect in the original piece (beyond, that is, inserting weasel words like “it could be argued that…”). Purely as a matter of rhetorical strategy, I still think it makes sense for proponents of democratization to use these kinds of arguments at the cost of temporarily making common cause with conservatives like Sulak — under the assumption that the enemy of my enemy is my friend (at least in the short term). As you pointed out, however, it is wise to tread lightly — perhaps more lightly than I did in this post.
[...] Thai Culture and Democracy KhiKwai: March 20, 2009 [...]
What do you mean the ultimate outcome is not in doubt? That is quite a statement of faith. Do you think humanity is heading ultimately, fatefully to the utopia of liberty, equality, and fraternity? It’s easy to say thus when one lives in the golden age of Pax Americana. History suggests the trajectory of humanity is quite precarious.
Excellent article! It’s real tragic for such a country like Thailand to [...SENTENCE REDACTED].
There is more nonsense spoken about ‘culture’ than just about anything else, and of all the nonsense spoken about cultures, there is none quite so ridiculous as that spoken about Thai culture.
Culture is just an expression of ‘the way we do things around here’. That’s all. it is nothing more than that and it has no more merit than that. The way we do things around here. In practice however, culture is often defined as ‘how the elites want everyone else to do things around here’, while they themselves are left free to do whatever they want. Same as the nonsense [... PART OF THE SENTENCE REDACTED...] and Thai law, and of course the legendary but undefined ‘Thai way’ (which is generally code for ‘a complete fuck-up’).
As a necessary adjunct to culture, it is necessary to create the impression of longevity. This is called ‘tradition’. Just about anything can be justified if you create a fictional longevity, or ‘tradition’ and attach it to culture. Humans seem to equate longevity with legitimacy, and human nature (which always seems to hark back to the ‘golden years’ that existed at some unspecified period in the past) grabs a hold of the tradition and holds it close in order to identify with it. And identifying with something, anything, or someone, anyone, is always better and more secure than being alone and un-badged. This is just the herd or tribal instinct.
Consistent with this, in Thailand, corruption is not addressed because it is ‘traditional’. Delay and double-speak are the Thai way because dishonesty is ‘traditional’ Thai behaviour. Delusion and fantasy abound in Thailand, and Thais generally have no problem distorting their perception of reality to conform to their idea of what ‘tradition’ dictates should be the case, because their whole sense of identity and worth is inextricably tied up in their ‘tradition’ and culture’, or (what is closer to the truth) one person who is held to be the embodiment of both – an equally fictional confection created and sustained by the elites.
By way of examples, most Thais believe that Thai service is high-quality because it is ‘traditional’, despite the fact that Thai service outside o the 5-star hotels truly sucks because the real Thai mentality is ‘if I have got the money already there is no need to provide the service I promised when I didn’t yet have the money’. And of course, the greatest ‘traditional’ fiction of all. The ‘Land of Smiles’, which in everyday use more or less reduces to the ‘Land of the Idiot Grin’. And that is before we get into a consideration of the difference between Thai culture and the reality of Thailand being the place to come if you want to fuck 12 year old kids.
Culture isn’t worth 2 knobs of shit. It is simply a part of the cradle-to-the-grave social engineering that the Thai elites perpetrate against the Thai people.
It is just an expression of ‘the way we do things around here’ or ‘the way we want everyone else to do things around here’, which is closer to reality. The demonstrated policy of successive elite-sponsored governments, of keeping people poor so they don’t question the culture (if culture is all people have got they tend not to question it), and uneducated (so they never realise that not everyone in the world is so completely propagandised as Thais) is simply designed to perpetuate the fiction of culture and tradition. So the haves continue to have and the have-nots continue to have not.
Rich
It is the very same idea of “culture” what should be challenge. Culture is a myth, a german invention. Specifically, Fichte invented the concept and Bismarck put it in practice with his policy of Kulturkampf (the fight for culture). Fichte took the medieval idea of the Kingdom of Grace, being the Grace what was underlying every human being, and substituted for Culture as the manifestation of the people’s spirit (Geist), so that a State does not legitimize itself as gendarme state, welfare state and so on, but as “Culture State”. The germans invented the “cultural nation” in opposition to “political nation” because they didn’t want to be like the french. There is no “thai culture” as well as there is no “western culture”.
For those who can read spanish or german there is a book on this matter by spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno, “El mito de la cultura”, “Der Mythos der Kultur”. Unfortunately there is no english translation.
Regarding the issue of the unsuitability of democracy in eastern societies, let’s say that is simply intolerable. These guys just wanna deny Darwin and argue that humans are blank slates modeled by circumstances, education or “culture” (the damn word).
By the way, just say that Italy, Spain, Greece and Germany are not democracies. The german scholars that analyzed in the 1960’s the Bonn Constitution stated that Germany (and hence the other countries above) is not a democracy but a Parties’ State. The institutions of this new State are not representative and the political parties are mere integrators of the masses in the State. In fact, this type of state was specifically designed for Cold War purposes and its main feature is an electoral system of proportionality, where the electorate vote party lists previously drew up by party chief. The result is not a democracy but an oligarchy. The real process of decision making rests upon three or four people. Since Aristotle that is an oligocracy, the previous step to democracy.
On this issue i strongly recommend a book by an spanish political thinker recently translated into english: Antonio Garcia-Trevijano, “A Pure Theory of Democracy”, University Press of America.
cry cry for peaple die
stop kiling
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