Dictatorship of the “poo yai”
The 2007 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand begins with a tawdry, obscene fabricaton. With Orwellian audacity, its preamble states: โดยที่การปกครองของประเทศไทยในระบอบประชาธิปไตยอันมีพระมหากษัตริย์ทรงเป็นประมุขได้ดําเนินวัฒนามากว่าเจ็ดสิบห้าปี. The official English translation is still more unequivocal, removing any language referring to the “development” of democratic institutions: “Thailand has been under the rule of democratic government with the King as head of the state for more than 75 years.” There you have it. No mention is made of aborted transitions and military takeovers. No significance is granted to the decades of repression Thailand experienced under the thumb of ghastly military dictators who governed the country with a level of savagery only exceeded by their greed. No meaningful role is attributed to the hundreds of brave young Thais who lost their lives so that others would have some say on how they should live theirs. Not so much as a footnote is reserved for the pro-democracy students at Thammasat University, whom paramilitary death squads raped, murdered, and hanged from trees — their bodies mutilated, eyes ripped out of their sockets, mouths stuffed with old shoes — in October of 1976.
The official, comic-book version of Thai history that the government routinely stuffs down the throats of millions of school children nationwide has no place for the Thai people’s painful struggle for democracy. Those who died, lost limbs, went to jail, or fled into the jungle for the cause did all of this for no reason whatsoever. They were fighting for what they already had, the dumb fucks. The 1932 coup? Not necessary. King Prajadhipok was ready to relinquish his absolute powers willingly, had anyone bothered to ask him. The 1973 and 1976 massacres? The students were misguided. And, under the circumstances, Thanom really wasn’t all that bad. Black May 1992? Again, it’s hard to see why the demonstrators were in such a rush to topple Suchinda. The constitution his government wrote was already reasonable. In any event, had the protesters just waited a little while, they could have amended it via the democratic process, which of course has been functioning uninterruptedly for over 75 years.
Plenty of elections have been held in Thailand since 1930s, at a frequency that has at times surpassed that of countries with rather more distinguished democratic records. But many such elections took place under conditions of severely limited competition, had their outcome predetermined by fraud or massive deployment of state resources, or in any case turned out to be irrelevant to the exercise of real political power. For much the intervening time, moreover, government alternation has typically been accomplished through coups, not elections. And though introducing, restoring, or otherwise saving democracy has reliably served as the rationale for many of the plentiful coups that have forcibly, if often bloodlessly, removed a succession of Thai governments since 1932, most of the “permanent” constitutions that have cyclically been promulgated, suspended, and flushed down the crapper were designed as a way to provide the regime of the day with the veneer of a legal foundation more than to regulate anything vaguely resembling democratic competition.
Government propaganda notwithstanding, Thailand has only been a “democracy” in any meaningful sense of the word for a relatively small portion of its post-absolutist history — a brief interlude in the 1970s (1973-1976), another short stretch between 1988 and 1991, a longer but equally ill-fated period between 1992 and 2006, and the year since the military last retreated to its barracks in December of 2007. Some of the recent events, however, call into question whether Thailand is now, or has indeed ever been, a democracy.
To be sure, definitions of democracy are contested. But most people who make a living studying this issue tend to agree that a system of government can be described as a “democracy” if and only if, at the very minimum, it satisfies seven procedural requirements Robert Dahl spelled out in his 1971 book Polyarchy.
1. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the elections of officials.
4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices.
5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.
6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
7. Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations.
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl (Journal of Democracy, 2: 75-88, 1988) later introduced two additional requirements that have won broad acceptance in the literature:
8. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials.
9. The polity must be self-governing.
It goes without saying that in many countries, even the most “democratic,” the rights and freedoms citizens enjoy are rarely absolute. In practice, many countries impose restrictions on who exactly can vote or run for office – some exclude citizens who are insane, have been convicted of a crime, or have recently declared bankruptcy; others impose age qualifications on exactly who can vote in some elections (e.g. only those voters over 25 years of age can cast ballots in Italian Senate elections) and run for particular offices (e.g., 35 years of age to be eligible for the Presidency of the United States). And, in most countries, the process by which political parties and organizations are formed is subject to some form of regulation that inevitably renders freedom of association never completely free.
So the problem is not really that some of these rights are not absolute in Thailand, but rather that the Thai government has restricted them to a point where it makes little sense to speak of the country as little more than a bastardized version of democracy. The deal-breakers, more specifically, are the inadequate protections that Thailand offers to expression, alternative sources of information, and association as well as the oversized role of powerful unelected institutions over elected politicians (requirements 5-8).
A song by The Clash captures freedom of expression as it exists in Thailand these days: “You have the right to free speech as long as you’re not dumb enough to actually try it.” The most obvious sticking point is the obscurantist lèse majesté legislation, designed to land those responsible for even the most minor, carefully worded criticism of the monarchy in jail for a period of 3-15 years (Article 112 of the Criminal Code). The recent arrest, legal harassment, prosecution, and in some cases the imprisonment of politicians (e.g., Jakrapob Penkair), activists (Boonyuen Prasertying), novelists (e.g., Harry Nicolaides), journalists (e.g., the BBC’s Jonathan Head), college professors (Chulalongkorn University’s Giles Ji Ungpakorn), and bloggers (like Suwicha Thakhor) for statements that cannot be reported here because the mere description of the offenses is itself grounds for prosecution attests to an inescapable reality. Thailand is a country that takes political prisoners. It is a country where those who object to the way the state is organized go to jail. For 3-15 years, possibly more if the current government passes legislation that has been proposed (if, for now, mercifully withdrawn) before.
Now there are typically three ways in which Thai officials explain the compatibility of “democracy” with these medieval restrictions on freedom of speech. Each is worthy of some consideration and rebuttal.
First, it is often noted that many countries typically described as democracies have laws that protect heads of state from vilification. That is certainly the case, but it should be noted that: 1) These laws do not protect heads of states from criticism of the kind that Ji Ungpakorn or Jonathan Head have leveled, but only from slander and name-calling; 2) These laws do not apply to fictional accounts like Harry Nicolaides’ – accounts of the kind that even Geoffrey Chaucer was able to get away with in fourteenth century England; 3) These laws are typically not enforced. I am not aware, for instance, of any case where anyone served any jail time in Italy for anything he/she has said about a head of state. Nor, it should be noted, am I aware of any Thai citizen convicted in a Thai court of law for offending a foreign head of state. Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya recently called Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen something along the lines of “deranged,” but no one has yet bothered to initiate the idiot’s prosecution.
Second, it is sometimes noted that countries like Italy and Germany criminalize offenses such as “the apology of Fascism” or the advocacy of Nazism, or that countries like the United States have laws that attach stiffer penalties to those who engage in violent offenses classified as “hate crimes.” Indeed, I believe that this is the best argument that Thai officials have at their disposal because these restrictions contradict a quintessentially “democratic” principle: the idea that you only support free speech if you are willing to champion someone else’s right to express the very views you most abhor. However, it should be noted that: 1) Again, these laws are enforced in very rare occasions – typically only when they are accompanied by violence or threats of violence; 2) It seems quite ludicrous to equate Nazism or Fascism – two ideologies responsible for the deaths of 50 million people in the twentieth century, with republicanism; 3) Lèse majesté in Thailand does not only proscribe debate over the form of government; rather, as Ji Ungpakorn has noted in a recent statement, it effectively restricts debate on matters of policy (e.g., economic policy); 4) As repeated instances of arbitrary enforcement and abuse demonstrates, lèse majesté laws in Thailand are less a mechanism to protect the monarchy (the King himself has put forth the idea that his actions may be subject to criticism) than they are an instrument for politicians (members of the Privy Council and the Democrat Party especially) to punish, harass, and muzzle their critics. Personally, I find it rather disrespectful of the King to suggest that his authority or prestige can in any way be diminished by the likes of Harry Nicolaides. I would submit that far more damage to the institution of the monarchy is inflicted by PAD activists caught on worldwide television holding up a portrait of the revered King while they are shooting at Thaksin supporters on the streets of Bangkok. Because, however, the PAD’s political agenda dovetails with that of Thailand’s urban/bureaucratic/military elites, these people were naturally never subjected to prosecution.
Third, lèse majesté laws are often defended on the grounds that they protect Thai culture. Sometimes this claim is accompanied by the assertion (though not really much in the way of argument) that they protect “national security.” That is fair enough; in fact, an overwhelming majority of the Thai people probably supports the laws on these very grounds. But you can’t have it both ways. You cannot have, at the same time, a form of government you call a “democracy” while at the same time restricting someone’s right to call for political reform. Democracies guarantee freedom of speech precisely because 1) It is believed people have a right to call for political, economic, and social change; and 2) Especially in need of legal protection are minority viewpoints that the majority of the people resents (for cultural, ideological, or any other reason).
Related to the issue of lèse majesté is the inadequate protection the Thai authorities grant to sources of information that challenge the state’s official ideology. Not only is the banning of publications and the blocking of thousands of websites espousing alternative viewpoints unacceptable in a democracy. The fact that the media in Thailand cannot (or are not willing) to report on the content of the offenses for which people are being prosecuted prevents any kind of real debate about the lèse majesté legislation itself. Simply put, the Thai people do not know what people are going to jail for. Consequently, it is impossible for most of them to have an informed opinion about the opportunity of having such laws, to judge how the laws are being enforced, or to consider how the current government’s witch hunt damages Thailand’s standing on the international scene. This, in turn, strengthens the ability of the Thai bureaucratic elites to use lèse majesté to protect their own hold on power, as opposed to defending the monarchy’s prestige.
The discussion of the restrictions placed on freedom of association in Thailand requires us to make a slightly more subtle point. On the one hand, political parties are acceptably free to form, register, and compete in elections. On the other hand, potentially more troubling is legislation (and its arbitrary enforcement) concerning party dissolution. The dissolution of the People Power Party, Chat Thai, and Matchima Thipataya recently ordered by the Constitution Court is illustrative of the fact that the rules on party dissolution are little more than a way for unelected institutions to restrict freedom of association in pursuit of a broader, distinctly undemocratic political agenda.
Ostensibly, these constitutional provisions are an instrument at the disposal of the Thai state to tackle the country’s endemic levels of electoral fraud. Any party whose Executive Committee includes at least one member who has been disqualified for egregious violations of the law by the Election Commission of Thailand is liable to be dissolved and have its ENTIRE Executive Committee banned from office for a period of 5 years. Laws this draconian are almost unheard of in democratic countries, where it is typically left to voters to decide which parties should survive and which should not. Even countries like India, where democracy works much better than it does in Thailand in spite of still more pervasive levels of corruption and vote buying, no such rule is on the books. And, considering that these provisions were written into the constitution by the 2006 coup-makers, who generally sought to put new legal safeguards in place against the return to power of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, it is hard not to wonder whether there is more to these rules than the fight against corruption.
In fact, the manner in which these rules have recently been enforced appears to substantiate these suspicions. In particular, it is worthy of note that the Constitution Court (an institution that many observers have had good reason to believe to be controlled by those very urban/bureaucratic/military elites) recently dissolved the PPP, brought about the downfall of its elected government, disqualified its executives for 5 years, gave the losers of the last elections the numbers to form a new government, and precipitated by-elections that subsequently strengthened Abhisit’s legislative majority due to the infractions of a single man – former PPP deputy leader and House Speaker Yongyuth Tiyaparat, found guilty of vote buying shortly after the 2007 election. Meanwhile, of course, the Democrat Party has been spared the same fate, as the ECT took a characteristically more lenient approach to the peccadillos DP candidates were accused to have engaged in. Just today, the ECT threatened PPP’s successor (the Peua Thai Party) with dissolution, should it move forward with a proposal that isn’t even explicitly banned by the constitution – appointing a person who has been barred from politics (in this case, Thaksin Shinawatra himself) to an advisory position – if the ECT finds that Thaksin’s appointment “adversely affects the country’s stability.” Of course, no one at the ECT batted an eye when banned politician Newin Chidchob openly negotiated with Abhisit the terms (and price) of his parliamentary faction’s support of the new government.
The undemocratic restrictions that exist in Thailand against speech, association, and access to alternative sources of information bring us to what is possibly the most important (if perhaps less visible to the casual observer) aspect of the country’s failure to conform to any reasonable definition of “democracy.” As the events of the past few months have rendered all too clear, Thailand is a place where real political power does not rest with elected officials.
To be sure, elected representatives and ministers drawn from their ranks have ample freedom to use their positions to get rich, help their proteges get ahead, and repay contributors of their support by plundering state coffers with impunity. What elected officials cannot do under the present circumstances is set national policy, especially of the kind that benefits the provincial masses. It’s when they try that the unholy alliance of Thailand’s military brass, bureaucratic elites, and what has been called the “blue blood jet set” based in the nation’s capital springs into action. If they can, they will use their control of the courts to overturn the results of elections through means that have the appearance of being legal. If they need to, they will send onto the streets gangs of paramilitary thugs like the PAD to castrate the government and paralyze the country, all the while guaranteeing that the nation’s laws will not apply to them. And, if they absolutely must, they will roll out the tanks and the special forces – formally taking power just long enough to write a new constitution that corrects the inability of the previous one to insulate Thailand’s ruling class from the nuisance posed by elected officials.
Of course, authoritarian rulers in Thailand – from Phibun to Sarit, all the way down to Prem – have a long history of vindicating the irrelevance of supposedly Western standards as well as invoking the amorphous concept of “Thai-style” democracy as an alternative better suited to the country’s history, values, and traditions. The problem is that a government without free speech, free association, and free access to alternative sources of information is no democracy at all. And, quite frankly, the form of government that has been evolving in Thailand over the last 75 years appears to be a uniquely Thai variant of dictatorship – one where an unelected, ruling class has sought entrench its power while rendering itself increasingly invisible (and, therefore, unaccountable) to the Thai people and the international community. In this sense, it is natural that Thailand’s real power holders and their vile propagandists in the local press would want to cloak their ”dictatorship of the poo yai” in the benign, legitimizing language of culture and democracy. It is the world at large, not to mention the good people of Thailand, who should wake up to the fact that “Thai-style democracy” is but the proverbial turd sandwich coated in a thin layer of chocolate.
(3 votes, average: 5.00 out of 5)
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Well told Kwai. They say life is like a shit sandwich: the more bread you have, the less shit you have to taste.
Quite possibly the best post in an already excellent blog on recent Thai politics so far; well researched and well written. Bravo.
It is such a shame that one has to come to amateur sites such as yours to get intelligent comment on current affairs that the mainstream [English language] media here in Thailand are too scared or self-interested to print.
Keep it up.
Yet another heavy artillery shot right on target!
The rule of law can only be weak in a country where laws are crafted for use by powerful people to oppress their rivals. What else are the lèse majesté laws and the latest constitution? A legal system that requires such abject grovelling will never be respected by people with even minimal levels of testosterone. Is it any wonder that thuggery, exploitation, and corruption are rife in Thailand?
(THIS COMMENT HAS BEEN EDITED)
Dear K.K,
Illuminating article. I have never understood how Thai
politics worked before, partly through disinterest and partly because I didnt want to offend my Thai friends sensitivities.
Lately however I took a second look at what actually goes on in their
politics and it’s a web of skullduggery, intricate manoeuvres that
would have had Machiavelli smiling with approval, & all for the sake of keeping intact what looks like a mediaeval power elite intact.
An elite with paid upholders who wouldnt hesitate to strike at perceived
enemies; with enforcers that can claim equal
effectiveness as the gestapo and kgb.
For the sake of maintaining this inviolate circle, it’s the majority of their lovable people who suffer educational and economic deprivations;
This isnt to say that other nations are better at looking after their
people, fact is there are nations who commit evenmore heinous crimes
against their own kind; it’s just that I shake my head when I see an
intelligent people like (the Thai elite) fail to do better for their
own kind. But I suppose history is littered with this type of cases.
The recent closure of their airport by this Elitist Circle comes to point: It didnt hurt their ringleaders but cost thousands of commoners to lose their livelihoods. Snug in their fortress villas these Villains can afford to continue their high standards of living and
blissfully ignore the economic chaos they have wrought on many a working class person’s wherewithal.
It’s not a pretty picture at all – but for their shortsightedness
the powers that be in this wonderful country things there could be better, a lot lot better.
email with-held as I travel there often.
gardoen
The arguments put forth in “Dictatorship of the Poo-Yai” are largely convincing, except that it seems to assume an unbroken alliance among PAD, urban/bureaucratic/military elite. On the contrary, I would argue that Thailand’s elite is not monolithic but fragmented. A sizeable middle class and intelligentsia outside the civil service does NOT agree with PAD. I fully agree that Thailand’s lese-majeste law is an arcane piece of obscurantist legislation that will come back to hurt the very institution it is (ab)used to protect.
It is time to think about a third-way movement to improve Thailand’s rules of law, strenghten its institutions, and prevent an illegitimate movement like PAD from re-emerging or strengthening.
Wally, You are right that the “middle class” and many intellectuals do not support the PAD. Indeed, as you mentioned, no group is monolithic. Note, however, that I never refer to “middle class.” The way I see it, the so called “middle class” – people who may have college degrees but make only as much as a passable prostitute does each month (say TB 30,000-TB 100,000) – is a key swing constituency in all of this. On the one hand, though they may feel superior to the country folk, they are about as powerless as the rural masses. On the other hand, by playing to their very superiority complex (the whole refrain about provincial voters being too stupid to have a democracy) the elites have proven successful in rallying a sizable portion of these voters to the cause in the past.
I echo all of the above positive comments. What is particularly worrying about Thailand and its pooyais is that whereas we would all hope that they would take the time and trouble to read comments such as those above, they don’t. They aren’t listening, they don’t care who disagrees with them. They do not see the rising tide of resentment and anger. They do not realise that they are already dinosaurs. They act with impunity and do not consider the consequences of what they are doing, Such is their arrogance.
In my opinion, the genie came out of the bottle a while back and is still coming to terms with a new environment. What the unlistening and uncaring elite are in the process of doing is ensuring, that when change comes, it will come violently because peacefully will not have worked. Then of course they will cry and whine and wonder why their luck suddenly became so bad, so off to the wat to make well-publicised and phoney merit in hopes of having better luck tomorrow.
Instead they should consider the wisdom of ‘tam eng’. They will have done it to themselves. And I for one will have no sympathy for them.
Rich
Anyone who notes… “that many countries typically described as democracies have laws that protect heads of state from vilification.”, ought to put the terms “God Save the Queen”, “Sex Pistols” and Lyrics in Google to get a sense of how differently these laws are applied.
It is inacurate to imply any level of parity between British and Thai laws aimed at protecting the Palace from insult.
This works too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_Save_the_Queen_(Sex_Pistols_song)
BBC wouldn’t play it, but nobody was charged with anything or sent to jail, apparently.
Are translations of Khi Kwai’s articles into Thai available? Anyone?
PIERRE: Not that I’m aware of, but I would be grateful if you could bring to my attention any you might come across.
Dear Kwai Jok Foong,
Thank you for your comments. In fact, I need your advice. I’m quite concerned by the following observations. 1. How can we have a more politically informed citizenry to improve the quality and moral integrity of ‘elected officials’ that you think deserve a more secure place in Thai politics. 2. How do we have political development that does not need to draw on the monarchy as a source of legitimacy, real or imagined? 3. It now seems clear that there are flaws on both sides; ie, both the previous government (and maybe later the Democrats, too), so what should be the way forward for Thailand’s political development, beyond finger-pointing and ex-post critique.
In my view, Thailand is facing a huge and stubborn dilemma because its elected officials, who are supposed to progress democratic development, have not shown enough accountability to prevent elitist interference. Although the elites should not have impunity from usurping political power through coups and movements like PAD, we still need to address the problems of corrupt elected officials who continue to be voted in election after election. When we have the electorate and the majority that shows little concern for corruption, nepotism, and misuse of taxpayers’ money, what do we do? Democracy is definitely a good cause to pursue and preserve, but what do we do with political crimes and fraudulent elected officials when they can always bail themselves out and avoid prosecution?
Please advise. Wally
‘Both sides’ refer to the government and the anti-government group like PAD. [... ]
COMMENT MODERATED: SORRY, I CAN’T PUBLISH THE REST
I don’t have any, sorry! I wish my Thai level was good enough to do the translation work myself.
WALLY: You have asked some very interesting questions (including the one I censored) that merit a detailed response. I’ll try to get back to you when I come home from work later today.
One of the most depressing things in Thailand is the failure of its universities (with the partial exception of Thammasat) to mount a challenge against the tawdry, obscene politics and intellectually perverse conceptions of nation, culture, religion and history that hold sway. And the biggest letdown is Chulalongkorn, supposedly the country’s best.
Was it naive of me to be shocked when I read that Giles Ungpakorn was reported to the police for lese majeste by the university’s own bookstore? Never mind the irony that he is a member of the Chula faculty, and that this was the only bookstore that dared to sell his book in the first place. The horrifying thing here is that a university reported an author to the police for a political crime. Everyone at Chula should be committing harakiri right now.
But this also draws attention to how Western institutions have been co-opted by the Thai academic funhouse. Chula’s Sasin business school is a joint venture with the University of Pennsylvania and Northwestern. Shouldn’t these universities be alarmed, and at the very least demand that Chula come clean on what happened?
Also of interest is that the Harvard Club of Thailand – for the most part a bunch of local fat cats who spent a year or two at the B-School or another of Harvard’s auxiliary branches – has invited foreign minister Kasit “closing down the airport was fun” Piromya to speak at its next gathering. The topic of the talk: “Restoring Thailand’s Global Credibility”. If he ends up fielding some tough questions, the evening might be redeemable. But knowing the Harvard Club of Thailand, that’s unlikely. After all, the club president, Sarasin Viraphol, is Kasit’s old buddy from the Foreign Ministry (and the author of possibly the most tasteless editorial ever written, which mockingly uses Samak’s liver cancer as a metaphor for Thai politics: http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/read.php?newsid=30091161&keyword=Samak+Sundaravej).
Then again, the folks at Chula have never had shoes stuffed in their mouths, so how can they be expected to appreciate the value of free speech.
Dear K.J.F.
Thank you! I hope we are in the same time zone…
Dear Wally,
You have asked some very difficult questions, for which I don’t presume to have an especially good answer. What I can do is provide some interpretation of the situation, in the hope it may be of some use to you.
In your comments, you state that:
“Thailand is facing a huge and stubborn dilemma because its elected officials, who are supposed to progress democratic development, have not shown enough accountability to prevent elitist interference. Although the elites should not have impunity from usurping political power through coups and movements like PAD, we still need to address the problems of corrupt elected officials who continue to be voted in election after election.”
You are quite right that Thai elected officials have not shown themselves to be particularly good stewards of democracy. However, the point I have made repeatedly on this blog is that it is partly by design that this has happened. More specifically, there seems to be a recursive relationship between the power of bureaucratic elites and the military on the one hand and the scarce cohesiveness, the fractionalization, and the reliance on patronage and corruption by virtually all of Thailand’s political parties on the other. Because a political system with these characteristics makes it easier for unelected institutions to exercise power behind the scenes, such institutions have sought to undermine any attempt to organize more cohesive, stronger parties that could counterbalance their influence. This was Thaksin’s great crime; as the events of the past few weeks demonstrate, these people don’t give a rat’s ass about something as trivial as human rights abuses. Having themselves hindered any progress in this direction – by staging coups (2006), by spreading disorder (PAD), by undermining the elected government’s ability to function (Samak, Somchai), by using the courts to dissolve political parties (PPP), and by seeking to buy off some of their components (Friends of Newin) – they have in turn reinforced, in part of the public’s mind, the notion that democracy is too chaotic and unstable to dispense with their influence.
The question that’s relevant to Thailand’s political development now is how this cycle can be broken. I am quite convinced that Thailand will find it hard to develop the kind of minimally responsible, accountable parties that rely on ideas more than they do on patronage so long as: 1) People like Prem call the shots behind the scenes; and 2) The military is not brought firmly after civilian control. To be sure, as you noted, to minimize “elite interference” will not solve Thailand’s problems over night. But it will at least eliminate a big contributing factor to the problem, giving democracy in Thailand a chance to develop on its own. On this issue, we should not forget that many of today’s most successful democracies once had very similar problems with corruption and patronage. If you get a chance, it might be worth your while to read parts of Richard Bensel’s book “The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” which portrays American elections back then in terms that are in some aspects quite reminiscent of the way they work in Thailand today. Besides, it’s not like the Bangkok elites and the military have proven any more competent or honest than elected politicians have. In fact, lack of accountability goes pretty well with corruption. Many of them even profess nostalgia for Sarit Thanarat, someone who was perhaps the most corrupt (not to mention brutal) Thai politician of the 20th century. They will tell you something along the lines of “the trains ran on time,” but then again so did they under Thaksin (with the added bonus of comparatively lower levels of graft and repression). And they didn’t like Thaksin very much.
This is the reason why this blog may appear to be “pro-Thaksin” at times, whereas in reality I don’t really harbor any sympathy or admiration for the man. To me, at least, he represented a comparatively smaller threat to the development of democratic institutions in Thailand than does the constant “elite interference” of which you speak.
Moving on to the most difficult issue you have raised (what’s the way forward?), I am afraid it is above my pay grade to offer a satisfactory answer. Generally speaking, the best I can do is to say it’s largely in hands of the Thai people. The fact that unelected institutions have proven reluctant lately to exercise power directly still gives the Thai people enormous room to shape their own future. It is with their vote that they can both soundly reject elite interference (the latest by-elections do not bode well in this regard) and demand of their elected officials greater levels of responsibility. As such, I think, the solution lies in their empowerment – intended both as economic empowerment (the kind that allows them to move beyond the most primary material needs that make vote buying such a cheap and easy way to mobilize voters) as well as the political empowerment that comes with their leaders and mass media treating them less as children in need of the poo yai’s guidance and more as citizens with a real stake and a real voice in the country’s politics. Allowing the open discussion and free exchange of political ideas is crucial in this regard. Judging from the recent crackdown on dissent, this is precisely what has the elites scared shitless.
Finally, I want to comment briefly on the institution of the monarchy. Some of the world’s most prosperous, most egalitarian, most “democratic” societies are constitutional monarchies. As wonderful a country as it is, there is no reason why Thailand should aspire to anything less while still honoring its traditions and its most beloved institutions. The way I see it, the obstacle to the country’s democratic development is NOT the form of government, but rather the use that the military and elite organizations like the PAD have made of powerful symbolism to repress dissent, silence opponents, and generally stifle political debate such as to render it the mere purview of the poo yai.
Once again, sorry if this doesn’t go terribly far towards answering your questions.
[...MODERATED: MY APOLOGIES. POINT WELL TAKEN BUT THIS CANNOT BE PUBLISHED]
Dear KJF,
Thank you for your reply. Again, I agree with you. The last observations-cum-concerns that I have now are 1) I find it difficult to criticize elected officials without seeming to support the civil-military elites. As a matter of fact, I do not support the civil-military elites and agree that their overt interference is hampering Thailand’s democratic development. 2) [...EDITED: POINT WELL TAKEN, BUT IT WILL HAVE TO REMAIN BETWEEN YOU AND ME].
Another aspect I find particularly disturbing in Thai politics is the virtual absence of the focus on ‘ideas’ and ‘policy debates’. I guess this is a characteristic of a young democracy that should be pardonned. But again, the absence of focus on policy ideas and the generally low quality of policy discourse and debates does not bode well for citizen empowerment. I think this, again, boils down to the issue of education and citizen awareness. But it also prompts me to wonder if ‘culture’; that is, the Thai culture, norms, values, and traditions, contributes to the very emergence and strenght of the civil-military elitist institutions, to the weakness of the country’s elected bodies,and to the relatively insignificant role that intellectual debates and policy ideas have in democratic elections and policy-making.
In other words, the temptation to blame it all on culture is rather strong, although I try not to go down that convenient path. For example, most high-quality debates about Thai politics are those that are in English, like this admirable blog. I’ve read Thai-language blogs before, but most of them don’t present high-quality discussion but rather are mostly vulgar and superficial in the use of concepts and arguments. I do not wish to sound elitist here, but that’s what I sadly discovered. However, I think I should remain optimistic that the Thai people will soon have more awareness and knowledge to choose what is best for them and their posterity. I know that it’s through no fault of their own that they have been ‘brainwashed’ to have certain undemocratic values and traditions, but now that we have better access to knowledge and ideas, I hope Thai people will learn how to think for themselves and aspire for nobler ideals and objectives. Again, I very much appreciate your comments, KJF.
WALLY: Actually, I don’t think it’s about culture at all. Thai culture is no less compatible with democracy than any other, notwithstanding what some people in Thailand say to legitimize the status quo. I think it’s largely about the incentives that these institutions have created for elected politicians.
Whilst most of this discussion has been about “the top” (government etc), I would like to share my observations about “the bottom” (the common people etc).
I am a foreigner working at a Thai institution. I do not openly or normally discuss Thai politics with my Thai colleagues but on a couple of occasions, I have been “invited” to comment.
One of my colleagues told me, “This problem must be solved by Thais & Thais alone.”
This person said this after I suggested that Thailand may benefit from the intervention of certain international bodies i.e. those that are used by many countries to monitor elections. I also stated that these “bodies” do not, in any way, tamper with the internal affairs of the country being monitored. They merely “report” upon the electoral process. Nonetheless, the person made the comment that I stated above.
It appears to me that “culture” & “nationalism” does affect the current Thai political situation, from the bottom up. Sadly, I do feel that “national pride” is a detriment to this “could be” great country. But the “elite” have it all worked out…as long as they can keep up the morning “indoctrination” at schools, there will be no problem with people (future generations) blindly following “the code of conduct”.
There is only one thing that could change this situation & so far, this “thing” has kept quiet.
Thailand will be a lot better if people can get access to information & if they can be free of “moral” guilt placed upon them. Where can this freedom come from? That “thing” that I spoke of is the answer but since it is quiet, one can only assume that this “thing” endorses the way things are now in Thailand.
A democratic Thailand will clearly be a struggle against the rich & the poor & all the while, the thing called “Thainess” will be used as a tool to control the masses. Not only that, many will be in a quandary about “Thainess” & democracy. Change is a most difficult thing for humans…particularly for those that have been indoctrinated for a long time, as they have no real grasp of “responsibility”.
WARNING: This is not entirely complimentary to Thais, especially the Bangkok Thai. if you do not wish to see the result, turn away now.
It seems to me that Bangkok Thais have a significant weakness in that many of them think that being Thai confers a privilege above other nationalities, and that they are genetically superior (yes, yes, I know, foreigners don’t understand Thais and all of that bullshit, but I can support this view from Thai news and academic sources).
This concept seems to me to flow directly from the top of the totem pole, from whom Thais have been encouraged for years to draw their whole sense of spiritual, personal and national identity. As far as snow-jobs go it is one of the best, aided by the policy of successive governments, of keeping rural folk ill-educated and poor so they provide a ready source of cheap labour and sex workers. Over the years in Thailand, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened and not narrowed, which is again, not accidental and the inevitable consequence of the polices of successive governments, assisted by a cradle-tp-the-grave propaganda exercise of which Josef Goebbels himself would have been justifiably proud.
The attitude that ‘Thais have to solve this and Thais alone’ is of course insular, xenophobic and not very smart, but it flows directly from this attitude. Most people know that it is not especially smart to eschew the knowledge and experience of those who have greater quantities of both, whatever their nationality, but Thai ‘pooyays’ seem to think that everyone except Thais are stupid (as the outrageous events of recent weeks adequately demonstrate). They have, in short, come to believe their own propaganda.
[...5 SENTENCES REDACTED...]
With any luck the rural Thai, who is broadly speaking an entirely different person from the unpleasant Bangkok Thai, is on the verge of enjoying real enfranchisement. I know many Thais from Isaan and the North and I like most of those whom I have met. The sooner they are allowed to learn about democracy, and progress beyond subsistence farming, the sooner Thailand can actually become what it has tried to pretend they are when looking for the tourist dollar – the Land of [genuine] smiles’. Sure both areas have their share of arrogant shits but they mercifully appear to be in much more of a minority than in the country than in Bangkok.
Roll on the day.
Tom
Begin.
1. The political problems faced by Thailand are complex and resistant to any easy or single solution. In other words,the complexity and tenacity of the crisis call for a combination of factors and theories to explain and solve it. Many assumptions require a multidisciplinary approach. It is undeniable that Thailand’s problems have several root-causes. Experience and wisdom would not tell us to rule out the significance of culture, which is closely linked to soft and often indeterminable elements such as history, values, religions, traditions, as well as ideas such as nationalism. The role of culture of politics and the shaping of political systems is almost a school of thinking in itself. And the term ‘political culture’ does exist in the socio-political lexicon. If we think that there is only one exit out of the building, then we will lessen our own chance of finding more exits that may exit, no matter how small, hidden, or insignificant.
2. It is possible to perceive the differences between ‘East’ and ‘West’, and of course, there are differences between Eastern countries, too. There is a wide range of degree to which China, Japan, and South Korea differ in terms of culture and how that culture shapes their social and political thinking. The same goes for almost every language and nation. It is a matter of degree. To rule out the role of culture is almost like saying that 20% means nothing at all. Sometimes, when the patient is dying, a 20% chance of survival would justify the use of all treatments available.
3. It is quite dangerous to assume that the ‘people of Thailand’ are good and innocent. This does NOT mean that they are inferior to any other people, either. As much as it is true that the urban middle class/intellectual elite in Thailand is far from enlightened, it is equally false to assume that the poor Thai villagers are good, innocent, and virtuous. Of course, the fact that they lack social and economic opportunities means that they deserve special attention and understanding and should not be blamed for some of their negative attributes. But at the same time, everyone, rich or poor, urban or rural, elite or mass, should aspire to be self-critical, because self-criticism is the most effective means towards self-improvement.
4. Calling the attention to the observation that culture has at least a partial role to play in Thailand’s political crisis does not imply any efforts to legitimize the status quo. In fact, the status quo is quite illegitimate and certainly unjustifiable. The aim, rather, is to caution against the neglect of related factors and root-causes that, when taken together, constitute parts of the problem.
5. Countries in this world differ in the level of peace and prosperity largely through the actions of their governments and history. But governments, as well as other institutions in the society, are also the products of cultural evolution unique to those countries. The roles of ’soft’ factors like cultures, values, and traditions are hard to quantify as they fall into the murky territory of the indeterminable. Hence, they are often ignored in political analysis.
6. Westerners often shy away from criticizing Thailand’s culture because they simply feel bad to do so. No good-hearted westerners would want to sound righteous, holier-than-thou, or be seen having the air of superiority. Besides, criticizing the Thai culture will surely provoke the anger of nationalism on the part of the Thais. But by seeking to improve its own culture, all countries, Thai and Western, only have something to gain. Being self-critical is the necessary first step towards successful reforms of any kind. If we think carefully about it, those government officials and politicians are also Thai individuals with real families and children. Some of their older family members, say, their grandmothers or grandfathers or uncles may even be those poor Thai villagers themselves. So, drawing the line between bureaucratic/political elite/middle class and the poor Thai people can be misleading. Thai people are certainly one of the nicest people in the world. And they are certainly binded through the Thai culture. As much as the Thai language is unique in many ways, the Thai culture also has its uniqueness. And it is this very uniqueness that manifests itself in the conditioning of politics. However, this does not mean that culture is the only factor. Far from it. Institutions and establishments need to be revamped, too, of course.
End.
On second thought, I don’t think I know how to separate individuals from institutions, from cultures, from history, or from anything anymore. I think Thais, the class or the mass, just need to be more self-critical. But I quite agree with Tom above that Thais in general think they know best how to solve their problems and sort of look down on all other nationalities. This kind of foolish arrogance will backfire one day. But anyway, Thais are not to blamed, right? They just have bad government and bad politicians, right? But where do these politicians come from anyway, if not from the Thai people?
I mean, those evil elites that have been finger-pointed as the cause of all this democratic failure and political deadlock are Thais, too, aren’t they? Those institutions and elites are surely to blame, but the mass and the rural people need to prove themselves, too. No-one is less vulnerable to corruption than another. Beware of the innocent villager myth. But I’m not saying the Bangkok people are all good, either. Generalization is valid to a certain extent, but it should not be taken without exception.
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