Every so often Thailand steps close to the brink, pundits dust off an old explanation for the peculiar instability of its democratic institutions. In essence, poor, uncouth provincial masses are said to want out of democracy something entirely different from what the more educated, value-driven Bangkok middle-class has come to expect. On occasion, each group is prepared to resort to decidedly undemocratic means to impose its own idea of what “democracy” is all about. 

The conventional wisdom tells us that voters in the provinces—about seven out of every 10 of the king’s subjects—could hardly care less about policy or ideology. Most are moved by their deference to patrons and local authority figures. Most vote on narrow parochial concerns. And most are blithely willing to sell their votes to the highest bidder. As a result, elected legislatures are typically stacked with representatives whom the urban middle-classes despise for their boorishness and gross incompetence. Inept, predatory administrations, in turn, generate profound disillusionment in Bangkok—triggering a crescendo of support for military intervention. The cycle begins anew when the urban middle-class finds military rule unpalatable, takes to the streets, suffers the requisite number of casualties, and somehow forces the military back to the barracks.